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Organizations
Tinghua Yu
Informational problems are prevalent in political organizations. To understand
incentive structures, transparency and policy expertise in political organizations,
we need to examine their informational problems. This collection of essays is a
contribution to the theory and application of information revelation in political
organizations.
In Chapter 1, I develop a theory of office incentives in a setting in which
agents’ effort is crucial for learning policy information. Many organizations, such
as government agencies and NGOs, learn about policy effectiveness through de-
centralized experimentation. However, unobserved effort by an agent can affect
the outcome of an experiment, thus limiting its informativeness. A principal can
improve the informativeness of an experiment by motivating the agent, using of-
fice as an incentive. The principal may keep the agent in office only when the
outcome of an experiment is good, thereby creating high-powered office incen-
tives for the agent. High-powered office incentives motivate the agent’s effort
in implementing the experiment in order to stay in office. However, they also
reduce the agent’s expected informational benefits from experimentation, which
can reduce the effort expended by the agent in implementing the experiment.
The degree to which the agent values achieving organizational goals affects such
trade-offs. I show that the principal is more likely to use high-powered incentives
when the agent places a high value on achieving organizational goals and when
multiple agents implement the same experiment.
In Chapter 2, I analyze a model where an autocrat may choose transparency
in disclosing information to members of ruling group, particular information per-
taining to the effectiveness of valence-policy by her. The effectiveness of the au-
tocrat’s policy directly reflects her competence. The members’ belief about auto-
crat’s competence in valence-policy making affects their support. If the autocrat
is transparent about policy effectiveness, particularly tell the truth of an ineffec-
tive policy, a favorable message of policy effectiveness will be convincing. The
members will support the autocrat upon receiving a favorable message thereby.
However, transparency also means a higher frequency of unfavorable message
which leads to the withdrawal of support by the members of ruling group. The
model shows the effect of intra elite conflicts on transparency. When the rul-
ing faction doesn’t depend much on the autocrat, the autocrat tends to be more
transparent. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between the degree
of ideological conflict among competing factions and transparency. As conflict
increases, transparency increases up to a threshold. Beyond this threshold, in-
creased conflict is associated with reduced transparency. In addition, the model
has implications on quality of bureaucracies that gather and report information.
Finally, in Chapter 3, I study how political polarization at the mass level af-
fects politicians’ policy making in common value issues. In the model, politicians
representing two groups of voters with divergent ideologies compete for office.
Voters have limited information about policy as well as politicians’ competence in
policy making. After observing the incumbent’s policy choice, voters make voting
decisions. I study two variations of election. First, there is a majority group and
a minority group in the society. Second, society is composed of two competitive
groups. In both variations, I show that in a society with a high level of polariza-
tion, the incumbent politician is more likely to exercise her expertise regarding
common value issues.
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Chapter 1
Office Incentives and Policy
Experimentation
1.1 Introduction
Many organizations, such as government agencies and NGOs, learn through ex-
perimentation. Outcomes of experimentation often depend significantly on unob-
served effort decisions made by agents. For instance, if a legislature wants to learn
about the efficacy of a new education program, individual schools decides how
much effort to exert in implementing the experimental program. Similarly, when
donors try out a new developmental project, NGOs that implement the project
choose their level of effort in it. In China, experimentation has decisively shaped
the making of policies in many domains, such as economic reform, inter-party
democracy, public eduction, etc.1
for discussion on policy experimentation on various issues. To learn how ef-
fective a new policy is, the authority in the central government often experiments
1See Cao, Qian, and Weingast 1999; Fewsmith 2013; Heilmann 2008; Wang 2009; Xu 2011.
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with it at the local level.2 Local officials implement experimental policies, and
the outcomes of experiments provide feedback for the central authority’s future
policy making. An ineffective policy produces bad outcomes. An effective policy
could also produce bad outcomes if agents shirk in implementation. With low
effort of agents, little could be learnt about the efficacy of a policy. In such a
process, agents’ unobserved effort limits the informativeness of an experiment.3
To maximize information, principals often use office itself to motivate the
agent to put effort into experiment. Because public bureaucracies and NGOs
do not offer much formal bonus pay for performance, using office as an incen-
tive is crucial to these organizations. An important component of office value
comes from agent’s preference for achieving organizational goals. The agent may
intrinsically share organizational goals.4 In the public sector, public service moti-
vation is the major source of intrinsic motivation (Francois 2000; Le Grand 2006;
Perry and Hondeghem 2008). The agent may also identify with organizational
goals other than serving the public good (Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Besley and
Ghatak 2005; Sheehan 1996; Wilson 1989). In addition, whether an organization
achieves its goal affects its funding and survival. Downs 1967 argues that “No
2 Local-initiated policy experimentation, and center-sponsored experimentation, distinguished
by the source of the policy decision, are the two main types of experimentation at the local level.
In local-initiated policy experiment, the local officials make the policy decision to experiment.
In center-sponsored experimentation, the central authority imposes experimental policies on the
local agents. In both types of experimentation, local officials are responsible for implementation.
Scholars debate about whether a specific local experiment is local-initiated or center-sponsored
(see Cai and Treisman 2006 for more discussion). The model in paper helps to understand center-
sponsored experimentation.
3 Hirsch 2016 and Chassang, Miquel, and Snowberg 2012 also discuss the implication of agent’s
effort decision for learning in experiments.
4The literature conceptualizes intrinsic motivation in two ways. Some consider that individuals
obtain payoffs only when they are working on the provision of the policy (Andreoni 1990; Besley
and Ghatak 2005). Others regard intrinsic motivation as a sort of pure altruistic concern that
causes individuals to care about the policy regardless of the policy provider’s identity (Francois
2000; Gailmard and Patty 2007). I take the first approach in this paper.
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bureau can survive unless it is continually able to demonstrate that its services
are worthwhile to some group with influence over sufficient resources to keep it
alive." Because the agent’s material well-being hinges on the organization’s fund-
ing and his career on the organization’s survival, the agent is concerned with
achieving organizational goals.
How should the principal use office to motivate the agent in decentralized
experimentation? Should she keep the agent in office only when the outcome of
an experiment is good, thereby creating high-power office incentives or should
she keep the agent in office regardless of the outcome? To address these ques-
tions, I develop a formal model to analyze the principal’s decision of whether to
introduce high-powered office incentives in decentralized experimentation. The
principal cares about achieving the organizational goal. When in office, the agent
also has a preference for achieving the organizational goal. A status quo pol-
icy and an experimental policy are available. The effectiveness of the status quo
policy in achieving the organizational goal is known. The effectiveness of the
experimental policy in achieving the organizational goal is unknown ex ante. An
effective policy is more likely to achieve the organizational goal if the agent works
harder. An ineffective policy always fails. To learn about the effectiveness of the
experimental policy, the principal chooses the experimental policy for the agent
to implement in the beginning.
The game begins with the principal’s decision of whether to retain the agent
only when the outcome of the experiment is good or to retain the agent uncon-
ditionally. The former type of re-appointment rule creates high-powered office
incentives and the latter, low-powered office incentives. The agent sets a level of
effort in implementing the experimental policy. At the end of the first period, the
policy outcome is revealed to all players. According to the re-appointment rule,
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the principal retains an agent in office or replaces him with a new agent who
shares the preference in achieving the organizational goal with the sitting agent.
In the second period, learning from the policy experiment, the principal decides
whether to adopt the experimental policy or the status quo policy. An agent
in office decides how much effort to expend in implementing the second-period
policy.
One building block of the model is that effort expended by the agent in exper-
imentation in the first period affects information about the experimental policy,
which is used for policymaking in the second period. A higher level of effort
provides better information about the experimental policy. Based on better infor-
mation, the principal can make better policy decisions in achieving organizational
goals, which benefits both the principal and the agent in future office. In other
words, both the principal and the agent in future office derive informational ben-
efits from experimentation.
To gain better information, the principal chooses office incentives that mo-
tivate the agent’s effort in experimentation. On the one hand, if the principal
adopts high-powered incentives, the agent may not stay in office. Yet the agent’s
effort in experimentation leads to his informational benefit in the second period
only if he stays in office. Higher-power incentives thus make the agent hold back
experimentation effort in the first place. On the other hand, high-powered incen-
tives may also motivate the agent. In order to stay in office, the agent puts effort
into experimentation. When the expected payoff of future office is higher, this
motivation effect of high-powered incentives are stronger.
The degree to which the agent values achieving organizational goals affects
the principal’s trade-offs. When the agent places a low value on achieving or-
ganizational goals, the agent is less motivated to exert effort. With low effort,
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his chance of staying in office to reap learning benefits is low. Thus, he is more
likely to hold back effort in experimentation given high-powered incentives. In
addition, a lower effort in experimentation leads to a lower informational bene-
fit in future office and hence a lower total expected payoff in future office. The
motivation effect of high-powered incentives is weaker. Therefore, high-powered
incentives are more likely to dampen incentives for the agent who places a low
value on achieving organizational goals. Consequently, the principal refrains from
using high-powered incentives when the agent places a low value on achieving
organizational goals.
Decentralized experimentation often involves multiple agents. Take China, for
an example, where most policy experiments are implemented by local officials
in different localities.5 Likewise, American bureaucracies are replete with of ex-
amples in which different agencies or branches within an agency carry out same
task.6 I extend the basic model to incorporate a situation with two agents. I
contrast the principal’s choice of incentive structures in a one-agent setting with
that in a two-agent setting. In the one-agent environment, only one agent’s effort
matters for policy learning. In the two-agent environment, both agents’ effort
contributes to policy learning. If the other agent exerts more effort, an agent’s
own effort becomes less crucial for policy learning, and the marginal informa-
tional benefits of one’s own effort diminishes. Balancing the cost of effort and
its return at the margin, an agent is less concerned with not reaping the learning
benefit in this case. In addition, if the other agent exerts more effort, information
about an experimental policy improves and an agent’s future office becomes more
valuable. This strengthens the motivation effect of high-powered incentives. Gen-
5See footnote 1 and footnote 2.
6For example, Bendor 1985 discusses issues in welfare policy in the 1960s.
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erally speaking, compared to the one-agent setting, the principal is more likely to
introduce high-powered incentives in the two-agent setting.
This paper contributes to the literature on incentive issues outside a standard
private-sector context (Acemoglu, Kremer, and Mian 2008; Akerlof and Kranton
2005; Alesina and Tabellini 2007; Benabou and Tirole 2003; Besley and Ghatak
2005; Dixit 2002; Maskin and Tirole 2004). It relates to the policy experimen-
tation literature, specifically the strand of literature that examines the aspect of
career risk involved with policy innovation (Cai and Treisman 2009; Majumdar
and Mukand 2004; Rose-Ackerman 1980). The difference between this paper and
that strand of literature is that this paper emphasizes how unobserved effort af-
fects the experimental outcome. In addition, this paper speaks to the literature
on policy experimentation in federal systems. One focus of the literature is on
the informational externality associated with policy experimentation across re-
gions (Callander and Harstad 2015; Strumpf 2002; Volden, Ting, and Carpenter
2008). Finally, vast literature discusses learning in the private sector (Bolton and
Harris 1999; Keller, Rady, and Cripps 2005). Some research examines learning
in a principal-agent setting where agents are motivated by monetary incentives




The game takes place over two periods, denoted by t = 1, 2. A principal P
makes a policy choice. Agent A1 and agent A2 implement the policies in their
own jurisdictions. P commits to a re-appointment rule which is based on Ai’s
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policy outcome in period 1. There are two policy options: a status quo policy,
denoted by 0, and an experimental policy, denoted by 1. In order to learn about
the experimental policy, P chooses the experimental policy in the first period. Ai
sets an effort level ai1 ∈ [0, 1] in policy experimentation. In period 2, P chooses
a policy p2 ∈ {0, 1}. If Ai is re-appointed, he sets an effort level ai2 ∈ [0, 1] in
implementing policy in period 2. Otherwise, a new appointee implements the
policy.
Let xit be the policy outcome in jurisdiction i at period t. If the policy is
successful, it yields an outcome of 1. If it fails, it yields an outcome of 0. The
effectiveness of a policy and effort in implementation jointly determine the policy
outcome. The effectiveness of an experimental policy, denoted by θ, is ex ante
unknown. It could be θ or θ. Throughout, I refer to type θ as “ineffective” and
type θ as “effective”. All players share common prior beliefs about θ, where
Pr(θ = θ) = 12 . If θ = θ, the experimental policy fails. If θ = θ, with probability
ait, the policy succeeds; with probability 1− ait, the policy fails. When the status
quo policy is implemented, the probability of success is γait. γ thus measures the
effectiveness of the status quo policy. It is known to all players that γ ∈ [12 , 23 ].7
In the end of period t, policy outcome xit is revealed to all players. I summarize
policy outcome as follows.
7 When γ ≥ 1/2, the ex ante outcome of the experimental policy in the first period is not
better than the outcome of the status quo policy. When γ > 2/3, even if the experimental policy
is revealed to be effective ex post, the principal is better off adopting the status quo in the first
period. Thus, the lower bound ensures that the principal undertakes experimentation in the first
period to learn about the experimental policy, and the upper bound ensures that experimenting
in the first period is possibly beneficial for the principal in the long run.
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If pt = 0, the policy outcome xit is distributed as follows.
xit =

1 with probability γait
0 with probability 1− γait.
(1.1)
If pt = 1, the policy outcome xit is distributed as follows.
xit =

1 with probability ait if θ = θ; with probability 0 if θ = θ
0 with probability 1− ait if θ = θ; with probability 1 if θ = θ.
(1.2)
In the beginning, P commits to a re-appointment rule that specifies a threshold
of the first-period policy outcome, denoted by σ ∈ {0, 1}. Only if xi1 ≥ σ, P re-
appoints Ai in the second period. If σ = 0, P offers low-powered office incentives.
If σ = 1, P provides high-powered office incentives.
P cares about policy outcomes in both jurisdictions, receiving x1t + x2t in pe-






Ai cares about policy outcome in his own jurisdiction and receives λxit if he is
in office in period t. λ ∈ [0, 1] thus measures the degree to which Ai is motivated
by organizational goals. The value of λ is known to all players. Ai incurs a
cost of implementation c(ait) =
a2it
2 . If Ai is replaced, a new agent has the same
degree of organizational-goal motivation as Ai. This assumption is to rule out the
possibility that P replaces Ai for pure selection reason, and thus to focus on the
moral hazard problem. Ai’s payoff function is
VAi = λxi1 − c(ai1) + Ii(λxi2 − c(ai2)),
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where Ii is an indicator function. Ii = 1, if Ai stays in office in period 2; and
Ii = 0, otherwise.
Sequence
This two-period game proceeds as follows.
1. Nature draws the value of θ.
2. P commits to a re-appointment rule σ.
3. Ai chooses ai1 in period 1.
4. Nature reveals policy outcomes xi1 to P and Ai.
5. P chooses p2.
6. The agent in jurisdiction i in period 2 chooses ai2.
Solution Concept
This game has a component of information revelation, so I derive perfect
Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies. I focus on symmetric equilibrium where
both agents adopt the same strategies. Let H1 be the set of all period 1 histories.
The equilibrium consists of strategies: σ, ait, p2, and beliefs about the experimen-
tal policy’s type. σ ∈ {0, 1}. ai1 : {0, 1} → [0, 1] maps P’s threshold choice onto
into Ai’s effort choice in period 1. p2 : H1 → {0, 1} maps the set of period 1 his-
tory to period 2 policy choice. ai2 : H1 × {0, 1} → [0, 1] maps the set of histories
leading to period 2 effort choice to period 2 effort choice in jurisdiction i. For
each history, players also have beliefs about the probabilities of the experimental
policy’s type. All players share the same prior belief, denoted by ρ0. Let ρ1j be
player j’s posterior belief by the end of period 1, where j ∈ {P, A1, A2}.
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1.3 Results
To show the cost and benefit of high-powered incentives in generating informative
experimentation, I begin with an example of one agent. Then, I consider the case
of two agents. In each case, I first derive players’ strategies in period 2 and
describe how effort in experimentation in period 1 affects decisions in period
2. Then, I analyze the agents’ strategies in period 1 under different incentive
structures. The principal’s choice of incentive structures is then discussed. Finally,
I compare incentive structures in equilibrium across two cases.
1.3.1 One Agent
In the basic setup, the notations are developed for a two-agent case. Here, I make
some necessary notational changes for a one-agent case. An agent is denoted by
A, his effort in period t by at, policy outcome in period t by xt, P’s second-period
choice by ps2, and her re-appointment rule by σ
s.
Period 2 Decisions
A key feature of the model is that information available to players in period
2 is endogenous to effort into experimentation in period 1. Suppose that the
agent exerts effort a1 in period 1 in equilibrium. Players update their beliefs over
the experimental policy’s type using Bayes’ rule.8 If the experiment succeeds,
knowing an ineffective policy always fails, all players infer that the experimental
policy is an effective type (ρ1j = 1). If the experiment fails, it could be caused by
an ineffective policy or by insufficient effort. More specifically, the posterior belief
8In the appendix, I show that given any belief that the principal could hold off-equilibrium,
the agent has no incentive to deviate from his equilibrium action.
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In the case of experimentation failure, the posterior beliefs of all players are less
than or equal to their priors.
Based on the information about the experimental policy, players make second-
period decisions. The second-period decisions include the principal’s policy choice
p2 and an effort decision a2 by an agent in office. Because the second period is the
last period, the principal chooses a policy that gives her a higher expected payoff
in single period, and the agent exerts effort to maximize his single period payoff.
Suppose that the principal adopts the experimental policy in the second period.
In this case, an agent in office exerts effort a2 = λρ1 and the resulted expected
policy payoff is ρ21λ. If P chooses the status quo policy in the second period, an
agent in office exerts effort a2 = λγ and the expected policy payoff in the second
period is γ2λ. If the posterior belief that the experimental policy is an effective
type is greater than the effectiveness of the status quo policy (ρ1 > γ), the ex-
perimental policy yields a higher policy payoff. This condition holds if and only
if the first-period experiment succeeds. Observing an successful first-period ex-
periment, the principal adopts the experimental policy in the second period. The
following remark summarizes the principal’s policy choice in the second period.
Remark 1. Given the outcome of policy experimentation in period 1, P’s period 2 policy
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choice in the one-agent setting is as follows.
ps∗2 =

1, if x1 = 1;
0, otherwise.
The Learning Premium
As discussed in the previous section, the principal’s second-period policy de-
cision depends on information revealed through first-period policy experimenta-
tion. Here, I show that policy experimentation is valuable to the principal and the
agent who stays in office. The value of policy experimentation depends on how
much effort the agent puts into experimentation.
Given the first-period effort a1 and the prior about the experimental policy, the
ex ante probability of an experiment being successful is 12 a1. By Remark 1, the ex
ante probability of the principal adopting the experimental policy in period 2 is
1
2 a1 and that of choosing the status quo policy is 1− 12 a1. Her expected second-




a1(1− γ2) + λγ2. (1.3)
The term λ12 a1(1− γ2) in the above equation is the principal’s learning pre-
mium. It represents the effect of the agent’s first-period effort in experimentation
on the principal’s second-period payoff. When an experiment fails, the exper-











a1λ(1− γ2) + λγ2
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imental policy is rejected by the principal in the second period. However, the
experimental policy might be effective and the agent’s shirking causes the fail-
ure. As the agent exerts more effort, the probability that an effective experimental
policy is rejected decreases. More effort into experimentation thus increases the
learning premium.
If the agent stays in office in the second period, he also benefits from policy
experimentation. In addition to the benefit from a better policy decision by the
principal in the second period, better information about the experimental policy
helps A calibrate his effort better. He works harder for a more effective policy
and avoids wasting effort on a less effective policy. Denote the agent’s expected










As part of expected payoff in future office, the learning premium of an agent in




2 a1(1−γ2). The higher degree to which the agent
is motivated by organizational goals, the more he values policy experimentation,
and the higher leaning premium he receives. The more effective the status quo
policy, the less valuable the policy experimentation, and the lower the learning
premium.
Low-Powered Office Incentives
First, consider that the principal chooses σs = 0. Regardless of the perfor-
mance, the agent stays in office and receives the learning premium in the second
period. Expecting this, the agent sets an effort level a1 ∈ [0, 1] in period 1 to
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a1 − c(a1) + E(w(a1)).








(1− γ2) = a1. (1.5)
The right-hand side of the above equation is the marginal cost of effort. The
first part in the left-hand side is the current marginal return. The second part in
the left-hand side is the marginal learning premium. The agent sets an effort level
such that the marginal cost equals the sum of marginal returns in two periods.
The following remark summarizes the agent’s decision in the first period given
low-powered incentives.
Remark 2. In the subgame where the re-appointment threshold σs = 0, effort in experi-







where the superscript denotes that the re-appointment rule provides low-powered office
office incentives.
Under a re-appointment rule that provides low-powered office incentives, as
the agent becomes more motivated by organizational goals, his effort in exper-
imentation in period 1 increases; as the status quo policy becomes more effec-
tive, the effort decreases. Current effort leads to better current and future policy
outcomes. The stronger the organizational-goal motivation, the more the agent
values policy outcomes, and the more effort the agent exerts. When the status
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quo policy is more effective, learning about the experimental policy becomes less
beneficial.
High-Powered Office Incentives
Now, consider that the principal sets σs = 1. She rewards the agent’s good
performance with future office. The agent’s effort in experimentation contributes
to good performance. In addition, his effort affects the learning premium which
is part of the expected payoff in future office. The following optimization problem






a1 − c(a1) + 12 a1E(w(a1)).
















(1− γ2) = a1. (1.6)
The right-hand side of the above equation is the marginal cost of effort. The
marginal current return is captured in the first term in the left-hand side. The
future marginal return has two components. The first component, represented
in the second term in the left-hand side, is the marginal increase in the proba-
bility of staying in office times the expected payoff in future office. With high-
powered office incentives, good performance is rewarded with future office. A
higher expected payoff in future office provides stronger incentives to work to-
day. The second component, represented in the third term in the left-hand side,
is the marginal increase in learning premium, holding the expected probability
of staying in office constant. Given high-powered office incentives, the agent also
faces uncertainty in reaping the learning premium. The uncertainty plays a larger
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influence on his effort decision when the marginal learning premium is higher.
Balancing the marginal cost and benefit, I derive the agent’s equilibrium strategy
in the subgame where the threshold σ = 1 as follows.
Remark 3. In the subgame where the re-appointment threshold σs = 1, effort in experi-







1− λ22 12(1− γ2)
,
where superscript denotes that the re-appointment provides high-powered incentives.
With high-powered office incentives, both the organizational-goal motivation
and the effectiveness of the status quo policy have positive effects on experimen-
tation effort. Intuitively, an agent who is highly motivated by organizational goals
works harder. But why does an agent put more effort in experimentation if the
status quo policy becomes more effective? On the one hand, when the status
quo policy becomes more effective, the learning premium becomes smaller, and
the agent’s tendency to shirk in experimentation increases. One the other hand,
when the status quo policy becomes more effective, the payoff in future office
increases, and the agent tends to work harder to attain office. Because the agent
reaps a learning premium with probability 12 a1, his tendency towards shirking is
discounted by 12 a1. Overall, the agent works harder when the status quo policy is
more effective.
The Principal’s Choice of Incentive Structures
As established in Equation (3), the agent’s effort in experimentation in the first
period contributes to the principal’s expected second-period payoff. Moreover,
the agent’s effort in the first period increases the probability of a good first-period
policy outcome and thus the principal’s expected first-period payoff. As a result,
the principal chooses an incentive structure that induces more effort in experi-
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mentation.
A comparison between Equation (5) and Equation (6) demonstrates the cost
and benefit of high-powered office incentives. On the one hand, by rewarding
good performance with future office, high-powered office incentives motivate the






2 a1(1− γ2) + γ2) in Equation (5). The effect is greater when the value of fu-
ture office is higher. On the other hand, high-powered office incentives introduce
uncertainty in reaping the learning premium and thus discourage effort in policy
experimentation. Given high-powered office incentives, the agent could only ben-





2(1− γ2). Provided with low-powered office incentives, the agent bene-





The agent’s expected marginal learning premium given high-powered office in-









2(1− γ2) thus represents the cost of high-powered incentives. As the
marginal learning premium becomes greater, the cost becomes larger.
The degree to which the agent values achieving organizational goals affects
the principal’s trade-offs. When the agent places a low value on achieving or-
ganizational goals, the agent is less motivated to exert effort. With low effort,
his chance of staying in office to reap learning benefits is low. Thus, he is more
likely to hold back effort in experimentation. In other words, the cost of high-
powered incentives is larger when the agent is less motivated by organizational
goals. In addition, when effort in experimentation is low, the expected payoff in
future office is low. The motivation effect is thus small. As a result, the principal
refrains from using high-powered incentives when the agent places a low value
on achieving organizational.
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To examine formally how the agent’s organizational-goal motivation affects
the principal’s choice of office incentives, I derive the difference between the equi-
librium effort under two types of incentive structures as a function of the value
that the agent places on achieving organizational goals and the effectiveness of
the status quo policy.






1− λ22 12(1− γ2)
− (1+ (1− γ2)λ
2
))
Based on the above expression, I display the overall effect of the agent’s value
of achieving organizational goals on the relative effectiveness of high-powered
office incentives in Figure A.1. As the level of the organizational-goal motiva-
tion increases, the relative effectiveness of high-powered office incentives first de-
creases and then increases. As a result, the principal provides low-powered office
incentives when the agent places a low value on achieving organizational goals
is low and high-powered office incentives when the agent places a high value on
achieving organizational. The principal’s decision about the incentive structure is












The principal chooses high-powered office incentives when the agent’s value
of achieving organizational goals is higher than a threshold, and low-powered
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incentives otherwise. The threshold is decreasing in the effectiveness of the status
quo policy. In other words, the principal is more likely to introduce high-powered
office incentives as the status quo policy becomes more effective and as the agent
becomes more motivated by organizational goals.
1.3.2 Two Agents
In a two-agent setting, policy learning depends on the agents’ joint effort. The
other agent’s effort also contributes to an agent’s future office value. If the other
agent exerts more effort, information about an experimental policy becomes bet-
ter and an agent’s future office becomes more valuable. Because of the increase in
the expected payoff in future office, the motivation of high-powered office incen-
tives is stronger. At the same time, as the other works harder in experimentation,
an agent’s own effort becomes less crucial for policy learning, and the marginal
learning premium of an agent’s effort diminishes. If provided with high-powered
office incentives, an agent is less concerned about not reaping the informational
premium. The cost of high-powered office incentives becomes weaker. Gener-
ally speaking, the existence of the other agent strengthens the benefit of high-
powered office incentives and reduces its cost. The principal who would have not
chosen high-powered office incentives in a one-agent environment now adopts
high-powered office incentives in a two-agent case. I formally demonstrates the
above ideas in the following.
I consider symmetric strategies of two agents. It is useful to denote with a
subscript −i parameters belonging to the agent that is not Ai. I start the analysis
with players’ period 2 decisions and a discussion of the learning premium. Then
I derive agents’ strategies under each incentive structure. Finally, I analyze the
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principal’s choice of incentive structure.
Period 2 Decisions
In the two-agent setting, the beliefs over the experimental policy’s type are
updated through policy outcomes in both jurisdictions. If xi1 = 1 or x−i1 = 1,
ρ1j = 1. As long as one jurisdiction observes a successful experiment, all players
infer that the experimental policy is an effective type. If xi1 = 0 and x−i1 = 0, for









When experimentation in both jurisdictions fails, for each player, the posterior
beliefs about the experimental policy are less than or equal to the prior.
Based on information of the experimental policy, the derivation of the agents’
effort choices and the principal’s policy choice resembles that in the one-agent
case. If the status quo policy is implemented, an agent in future office sets an
effort level at λγ, which results in γ2λ policy payoff in expectation. If the ex-
perimental policy is implemented, an agent in future office exerts λρ1p level of
effort and the expected policy payoff is ρ21pλ. Clearly, the principal adopts the
experimental policy if her posterior belief that the experimental policy is effective
is greater than the effectiveness of the status quo policy. As long as one district
observes a successful experiment, the principal infers that the experimental policy
is an effective type. Therefore, the principal adopts the experimental policy in the
second period as long as one of the districts succeeds in experimentation, and the
status quo policy otherwise.
Remark 4. Given the outcomes of policy experimentation in period 1, P’s period 2 policy
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choice in two-agent setting is as follows.
p∗2 =

1, if xi1 = 1 or x−i1 = 1;
0, otherwise.
The Learning Premium
The agents’ effort affects information revelation and thus the learning benefit
of policy experimentation. Given the first-period effort level profile {ai1, a−i1} and
the prior about the experimental policy, the ex ante probability of an experiment
being successful is 12(1− (1− ai1)(1− a−i1)). Following Remark 4, the principal
adopts the experimental policy in period 2 with an ex ante probability of 12(1−
(1− ai1)(1− a−i1)) and the status quo policy with an ex ante probability of 1−
1
2(1− (1− ai1)(1− a−i1)). Her expected second-period policy payoff is
E(v(ai1, a−i1)) = λ
1
2
(1− (1− ai1)(1− a−i1))(1− γ2) + λγ2, (1.7)
where λ 12(1− (1− ai1)(1− a−i1))(1−γ2) is the principal’s learning premium.10
Each agent’s effort in experimentation affects information revelation and thus the
quality of policy decision. The effect of an agent’s effort ai1 on learning premium
is diminishing in the other agent’s effort a−i1. An agent’s marginal contribution
to better policy making is diminishing in the other’s effort. As long as one exper-
iment succeeds, an effective experimental policy is not rejected by the principal.
The more effort by the other agent, the more likely the other agent’s experiment is
successful, and the less important an agent’s own success is to the policy making.
If an agent Ai stays in office in the second period, he also benefits from policy
10The derivation resembles the one in footnote 9.
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2(1− (1− ai1)(1− a−i1))(1− γ2) is Ai’s learning premium. As in the one-
agent case, better information helps the principal make a better policy decision,
which is also in the interest of an agent. Based on better information, an agent
can also calibrate effort better in the second period. The other agent’s effort into
experimentation contributes to policy learning and thus the value of future office;
it also reduces the marginal contribution of an agent’s effort to the policy learning.
Low-Powered Office Incentives
When provided with low-powered office incentives, Ai stays in office for two
periods. The expected payoff in future office E(w(ai1, a−i1)) depends on Ai’s effort
as well as the other agent’s effort. Expecting effort a−i1 by the other, Ai exerts an






ai1 − c(ai1) + E(w(ai1, a−i1))








(1− γ2)(1− a−i1) = ai1 (1.9)
Ai’s first-period effort increases the value of learning premium. The marginal




2(1− γ2)(1− a−i1) in the first-order condi-
tion, is decreasing in the other agent’s effort a−1i. The following remark charac-
terizes A’s decision in the first period, given low-powered office incentives.
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Remark 5. In the subgame where the re-appointment threshold σ = 0, effort in experi-








where the superscript denotes that the re-appointment rule provides low-powered office
incentives.
As in the one-agent setting, the organizational-goal motivation has a positive
effect on level of effort in experiments in the two-agent environment, and the
effectiveness of the status quo policy has a negative effect.
High-Powered Office Incentives
With high-powered office incentives, the probability of staying in office de-
pends on an agent’s effort ai1 in the first period. The value of future office in
jurisdiction i depends on both Ai’s effort ai1 and A−i’s effort a−i1. Ai chooses his






ai1 − c(ai1) + 12 ai1E(w(ai1, a−i1))
















(1− γ2)(1− a−i1) = ai1
(1.10)
When the principal provides high-powered office incentives, good performance




2(1 − (1 − ai1)(1 − a−i1))(1 −
γ2) + γ2). A−i’s effort contributes to Ai’s future office value and enhances his
incentives to work today. With high-powered incentives, Ai is also concerned
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2(1 − γ2)(1 − a−i1). Because Ai balances the return and cost of his effort at
the margin, what matters is the marginal learning premium. When the marginal
learning premium is lower, the concern has less influence on an agent’s effort
decision. The other’s effort a−i1 diminishes the marginal learning premium and
thus attenuates Ai’s concern. As a−i1 increases, high-powered office incentives
become more effective in inducing Ai1’s effort. The following remark summarizes
the equilibrium strategy in the subgame where the threshold σ = 1.
Remark 6. In the subgame where the re-appointment threshold σ = 1, effort in experi-
mentation in period 1 in jurisdiction i is
ah∗i1 =
−(1− 38λ2(1− γ2)) +
√




where the superscript denotes that the re-appointment provides high-powered office incen-
tives.
In the two-agent case, both the organizational-goal motivation and the effec-
tiveness of the status quo policy have positive effects on an agent’s effort in ex-
perimentation. As demonstrated in the previous section, the same result holds in
the one-agent setting.
Principal’s Choice of Incentive Structures
Similar to high-powered office incentives in the one-agent case, high-powered
office incentives have costs and benefits in motivating the agent in a two-agent




2(1 − (1 − ai1)(1 −
a−i1))(1− γ2) + γ2) in equation(10). Comparing Equation (9) and Equation (10),
an agent’s marginal learning premium given high-powered office incentives is
CHAPTER 1. OFFICE INCENTIVES AND POLICY EXPERIMENTATION 25
less than that given low-powered office incentives. The difference capturing the




2(1− γ2)(1− a−i1). As the other agent’s effort in experimen-
tation increases, an agent’s future office value increases, and the office motivation
is stronger. Meanwhile, as the other puts more effort, an agent’s marginal contri-
bution to policy learning diminishes, and the cost is less.
How does the level of the organizational-goal motivation affect the princi-
pal’s choice of the incentive structure in the two-agent setting? In addition to an
agent’s own organizational-goal motivation, the organizational-goal motivation
of the other agent also affects the cost and benefit of high-powered office incen-
tives. Homogenous agents share the same level of organizational-goal motivation.
When the organizational-goal motivation increases, the other agent tends to put
more effort as well. More effort by the other increases an agent’s expected payoff
in future office and reduces his marginal contribution to policy learning. This
strengthens the office motivation but weakens the the cost of high-powered of-
fice incentives. Formally, the effect of the organizational-goal motivation on the
relative effectiveness of high-powered office incentives is as follows.
ah∗i1 − al∗i1 =
−(1− 38λ2(1− γ2)) +
√








Figure A.3 shows how the relative effectiveness of high-powered office incen-
tives changes as the level of the organizational-goal motivation changes, given
the effectiveness of the status quo policy. Contrasting Figure A.1 and Figure
A.3, I have two observations. First, similar patterns are evident in both settings.
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The relationship between the relative effectiveness of high-powered office incen-
tives and the level of the organizational-goal motivation is U-shaped. Second,
given the same effectiveness of the status quo policy, the turning point at which
the organizational-goal motivation starts to reinforce the relative effectiveness of
high-powered office incentives is different in two settings. It is at a lower level in
the two-agent setting than that in the one-agent setting.
The following proposition characterizes the principal’s choice of the re-appointment












−9+ 2γ2 + 16γ4 − 2γ6 − 7γ8












−4− 8γ2 + 12γ4
1− γ2 − γ4 + γ6
+







Similar to the results in the one-agent setting, the principal chooses high-
powered office incentives only when the organizational-goal motivation is above
a threshold. Given the same effectiveness of status quo policy, the threshold in
the two-agent case is lower than that in a one-agent case.
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1.3.3 Comparison of Incentive Structures in One-Agent Setting
and Two-Agent Setting
Figure 5 contrasts incentive structures in the one-agent setting and that in the
two-agent setting. When a status quo policy is effective, high-powered office
incentives are introduced in both settings. When a status quo policy is ineffec-
tive and policy motivation is low, low-powered office incentives are adopted in
both settings. When a status quo policy is ineffective but policy motivation is
high, high-powered office incentives are chosen in the two-agent setting and low-
powered office incentives in the one-agent setting. Unlike the one-agent setting,
high-powered office incentives also induce more effort by the other agent in the
two-agent setting, which in turn increases the expected payoff in an agent’s fu-
ture office but reduces an agent’s marginal contribution to policy learning. This
increases the office motivation and decreases the cost of high-powered office in-
centives. Therefore, high-powered office incentives are more effective in the two-
agent setting. Broadly speaking, the principal is more likely to introduce high-
powered office incentives in the two-agent environment.
1.4 Applications
In this section, I discuss two main contexts in which the model applies. I begin
with a discussion of public bureaucracy reform. I then discuss how the imple-
mentation of development programs might fit the model.
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1.4.1 Public Bureaucracy Reform
The model casts light on issues in the design of incentives in public bureaucracies.
By focusing on office as a key incentive and the notion that agents share organiza-
tional goals, my approach highlights the incentive issues in public bureaucracies
that are different from those in standard private organizations.
The results developed in the model provide some insight into how to offer
office incentives when learning is a crucial matter to the organization. Given
that agents’ intrinsic motivation is a key reason why agents care about achieving
organizational goals, this framework implies that office incentives should vary
with the degree to which agents are intrinsically motivated. Because of this, the
effect of reform of office incentives in public sectors depends on the degree of
agents’ intrinsic motivation across sectors. In the case of the Chinese bureaucracy,
the introduction of high-powered office incentives in environmental agencies and
food and drug agencies is an important issue. It is frequently suggested that the
policy outcomes is better when the careers of agents in these sectors are tied to the
policy outcomes. The model suggests that this type of high-powered incentive is
effective provided that these agents care about achieving the organizational goals.
However, agents in the Chinese bureaucracy are often rotated across different
sectors, and they often do not decide to work in a specific sector. As a result,
they might not intrinsically share the goals of a specific organization. The average
level of intrinsic motivation in an organization depends on the profile of all agents’
career paths. Without taking agents’ career paths into consideration, attempts to
introduce high-powered incentives might reduce the efficiency of these agencies.
Another aspect of public sector reform concerns competition among providers
of public goods. As Kaufman 1976 suggests, one of the threats to agencies’ sur-
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vival is competition among agencies for scarce resources. The probability of
agency termination is higher when competition among agencies for scarce re-
sources is greatest. A similar logic could hold in the relationship between com-
petition among agencies and agencies’ funding. By affecting the survival and
funding of an organization, competition changes the degree to which agents care
about achieving organizational goals. The approach developed here shows how
competition complements high-powered office incentives in the case of learning.
High-powered office incentives are more effective when the organization faces
fiercer competition. Cross-sectionally, this approach predicts that high-powered
office incentives are likely to be negatively correlated with the level of learning
when the intensity of competition is low and positively correlated with the level of
learning when the intensity of competition is high. It therefore seems unsurpris-
ing that high-powered office incentives are often used in the public organizations
that face fierce competition. Within the Chinese bureaucracy, for example, local
governments that face intense competition in attracting capital investment often
provide high-powered office incentives for agents working on issues of economic
development. Under the current Hukou institution which controls population
movement, beneficiaries of many public goods is less mobile. This implies a low
level of competition among public goods providers across localities. It might
explain why low-powered office incentives exist in agencies such as local envi-
ronmental agencies.
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1.4.2 Developmental Programs, NGOs and Government Agen-
cies
In developing countries, NGOs have been increasingly involved in the provision
of relief, welfare, social services and various development projects.11 In many
of these sectors, a growing emphasis on impact evaluation shows a need for in-
novation and learning. But the outcomes of similar projects implemented by
government agencies and that of NGOs are often different.12
It is recognized in the literature that the level of agents’ intrinsic motivation
varies between NGOs and government agencies. This difference might explain
the variation in their performance. As argued by Besley and Ghatak 2001, NGOs
may find it easier to screen on motivation than the government and they may also
foster public service motivation by providing a better match between the ends
of the organization and those of its workers. The electoral concerns of a govern-
ment imply that some public servants have to carry out policies that they do not
believe in. Their public service motivation is thus undermined. Another key is-
sues in the performance variations between the government agencies and NGOs
is that of accountability structure. Compared with government agencies, the for-
mal accountability of NGOs is weak. In the context of international development
projects, because of the cultural distance between NGOs and local beneficiaries,
informal accountability measures, such as social sanctions and enforcement, tends
to be weak in the case of NGOs.13
11See Besley and Ghatak 2001 for a detailed discussion.
12For example, using data on 20 different types of interventions, Vivalt 2015 shows
that government-implemented programs also had smaller effect sizes than academic/NGO-
implemented programs.
13Social sanctions and enforcement play a decisive role for accountability. Miguel and Gugerty
2005 studies how an inability to impose social sanctions in diverse communities leads to collective
CHAPTER 1. OFFICE INCENTIVES AND POLICY EXPERIMENTATION 31
When explaining the performance difference between NGOs and government
agencies, the existing literature treats the effect of agents’ intrinsic motivation and
the effect of the accountability as separate issues. In terms of the model developed
here, different accountability structures correspond to different types of office in-
centives. This framework thus underlines the complementarity between intrinsic
motivation and strong accountability in promoting performance of developmental
programs.
In addition to these empirical implications, the model can also provide some
insights into issues in strengthening accountability in both NGOs and government
agencies. In a setting where learning is important for the social service delivery,
the model suggests that strong accountability is suitable for organizations with
highly-motivated agents. If it is true that agents in NGOs are on average more
motivated than government agents, strengthening accountability in NGO would
have a stronger positive effect on performance than strengthening accountability
in a government agency. In fact, if government agents are not well motivated
intrinsically, strengthening accountability might backfire.
1.5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to explore a principal’s decision about agents’ office
incentives in a setting in which agents’ effort in experimentation is crucial for pol-
icy learning. The principal constructs office incentives to induce agents’ effort in
experimentation. High-powered office incentives link good performance to office-
holding and thus motivate agents to exert effort. At the same time, by introducing
uncertainty in whether the agent could reap the informational benefit from learn-
action failures in rural western Kenya.
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ing, high-powered office incentives also disincentivize effort in experimentation.
When agents are highly motivated by organizational goals, the principal is likely
to introduce high-powered office incentives. Compared with the one-agent envi-
ronment, the principal is more likely to provide high-powered office incentives in
the two-agent environment.
These ideas are relevant to the discussion of organizations in which agents
have a preference for achieving organizational goals. Examples of such organiza-
tions include public bureaucracies and NGOs. However, private firms also social-
ize their employees to share their organizational goals. In future work, it would
be valuable to extend this framework to such firms, in order to understand how
the interaction between organizational goals and personnel management affects
learning and innovation in the private sector.
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Chapter 2
Intra-elite Conflict and Information
Disclosure
2.1 Introduction
In the late 1950s, Mao the then leadership of the Chinese government adopted
the Great Leap Forward policy. This policy caused one of the greatest famines
in human history.1 Yet, when the famine was spreading over the country, the
communist party elites received reports that demonstrate how effective the Great
Leap Forward Policy is. In other words, there was low level of transparency about
policy effectiveness among party elites. As the party leadership, Mao had control
over how information about policy is disclosed to the party elites. He achieved
this low level of transparency by structuring the bureaucracy that involved with
information gathering and reporting. Mao advocated that politics should take
command over the statistical report system. Data collected by party cadres as-
sisted by the masses were supposed to be more accurate than the bureaucrats in
the statistical system. The result was gross exaggeration of production figures in
1958 and the breakdown of much statistical reporting for several years (Banister
1The mortality estimates range from 16.5 million (Coale 1981) to 30 million (Banister 1991) to
45 million (Dikötter 2010).
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1991). In addition, Mao waged political campaign to cultivate low-level officials’
radical ideology and to shape their career incentives accordingly. Motivated by
radical ideology and career incentives, lower-level officials tend to over-report
grain production (Bachman 2006; Kung and Chen 2011). Comparing to Mao’s
low transparency in disclosing information regarding policy effectiveness, Deng
who became the leadership of the communist party promoted transparency. In
Deng’s era, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Politburo, and the Cen-
tral Committee began meeting regularly, following formal rules of consultation,
division of labor, and consensual decision making. In these meetings, information
regarding policy effectiveness is shared by party elites (Bo 2010).
Information disclosure takes place through various forums in autocracies other
than China. Legislative bodies are main forums where information is disclosed
to the ruling group (Boix and Svolik 2013; Svolik 2012). These legislative bod-
ies include politburo, parliament, royal council, etc. The amount of information
disclosed in the legislative bodies varies across different regimes. The legislative
bodies in PRI Mexico was documented to have more information sharing (Mag-
aloni 2006). In the Egyptian case, the legislative body is depicted as mainly for
rents distribution (Blaydes 2010).
How to explain the variations in transparency of policy effectiveness among
ruling group? When does an autocrat tell truth of ineffectiveness of her policy
to the ruling group? To address these questions, I develop a framework of infor-
mation disclosure, particular information pertaining the effectiveness of policy,
focusing on the elite conflict within the authoritarian regime. Different from the
existing research on the transparency of autocrat’s behavior (Boix and Svolik 2013;
Svolik 2012), I consider a problem of transparency of policy effectiveness. Because
the effectiveness of her policy directly reflects her competence in policy making,
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the autocrat is concerned with disclosing information of policy effectiveness. This
approach focuses on elite conflicts which is a common phenomena in autocracies.
The dynamics of elite conflicts are used to explained for various political eco-
nomic outcome in autocracies.2 Two main types of elite conflicts are considered.
One is the conflict between the incumbent autocrat and the ruling group. The
incumbent autocrat prefers to stay in power regardless of her own competence
while the ruling group prefers an autocrat with high competence.3 The other is
the conflict among the members of ruling group. There often exists competing
factions with different political interest them.4 This paper considers both types of
elite conflicts.
In the framework, there is an incumbent autocrat and a ruling group. The
ruling group is split into two factions. The autocrat prefers to stay in power. To
stay in power, the autocrat needs to win support from her own faction, call it the
ruling faction, and prevent overthrow from the opposition faction. The two fac-
tions have different ideologies. The ruling faction shares the same ideology with
the autocrat while the opposition faction has a different ideology. Both factions
prefer an autocrat who is competent in making valence policy. The autocrat’s
competence determines the effectiveness of the valence policy. More specifically,
high competence leads to effective policy and low competence ineffective policy.
Consequently, factions form beliefs of autocrat’s competence based on their belief
of the policy effectiveness. Ex ante, the autocrat’s competence is unknown to both
the autocrat and the factions. To affect the factions’ belief of her competence, the
2see De Mesquita 2005; Gandhi 2008; Geddes 1999 among others.
3 Besley and Kudamatsu 2007 discuss how this conflict affects performance across autocracies.
4see Huang 2006; Teiwes and Sun 1999 for discussion on factional competition in Chinese
politics.
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autocrat designs a disclosure of information of policy effectiveness: a plan of how
to report policy effectiveness. The autocrat commits to her plan of information
disclosure. Upon observing the report about policy effectiveness, factions update
their beliefs of the autocrat’s competence. The ruling faction makes a decision
whether to keep the autocrat or replace her with a candidate from the ruling fac-
tion. Then the opposition has a chance to decide whether to keep ruling faction’s
choice or replace her with a candidate from its own faction.
We use the framework to explore how aspects of elite conflict affect trans-
parency. An information disclosure that reveals the truth about ineffective policy
more often is more transparent. On the one hand, the frequency of favorable mes-
sages about policy is lower under a more transparent information disclosure. On
the other hand, a more transparent information disclosure produces a stronger
belief of the incumbent’s competence given a favorable message. Due to their
conflicting ideologies, the opposition requires a stronger belief of the incumbent’s
competence to support her than the ruling faction. Hence, to persuade the oppo-
sition, the ruler has to be more transparent about ineffective policy and sends fa-
vorable message less frequently. Yet, if the opposition is convinced by a favorable
message, the ruler stays in office for certain. Therefore, when deciding whether
to persuade the opposition or just the ruling faction, the ruler faces a trade-off
between the frequency that a favorable message arrives and the frequency that a
favorable message leads to political survival.
The strength of ruling faction and dependence of ruling faction on the incum-
bent autocrat decrease the autocrat’s incentive to persuade the opposition faction
and hence the level of transparency. When the ruling faction is strong, the au-
tocrat stays in office with high probability with only the support of the ruling
faction. When the ruling faction depends more on the incumbent ruler, the rul-
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ing faction requires a weaker belief of the autocrat’s competence to support her.
A less transparent information disclosure is needed to win the ruling faction’s
support.
Ideological conflict has a non-monotonic effect on the level of transparency.
When there exists little ideological conflict, the opposition requires a bit stronger
belief of the autocrat’s competence than the ruling faction. The autocrat hence
discloses more transparent information to persuade the opposition. As the ideo-
logical conflict increases, a stronger belief of her competence is needed to sustain
the support of the opposition, a more transparent information disclosure will be
necessary. When there exists a great ideological conflict, the belief of her compe-
tence required by the opposition is much stronger than that of the ruling faction.
Thus the autocrat chooses to be transparent enough that only the ruling faction is
persuaded. As the ideological conflict increases, the ruling faction would incur a
large ideological lost if the opposition’s ideology is imposed. This makes the rul-
ing faction easier to be persuaded. A less transparent information disclosure will
be needed. Overall, as ideological conflict increases, transparency increases up
to a threshold. Beyond this threshold, increased ideological conflict is associated
with reduced transparency.
In addition, this framework has implications on how elite conflicts affect bu-
reaucratic quality. In the framework, the autocrat commits to her plan of infor-
mation disclosure. To make the commitment credible, the autocrat often dele-
gates the information gathering and reporting to bureaucracies. Once the bureau-
cracy is structured, bureaucrats make decision about what information to gather
and how to report it. Therefore, the autocrat has some commitment power to
truthfully communicate the message produced by the bureaucracy to the ruling
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group.5 By structuring the bureaucracy, the autocrat implements a desirable level
of transparency. If the bureaucracy has Weberian aspects such as autonomy, pro-
fessionalism, and etc., transparency is likely to be high. We expect to see a high
quality bureaucracy when the elite conflicts lead to a high level of transparency.
For example, the transparency in information disclosure among members of rul-
ing group in China has been improved since Mao’s death. The bureaucracies
involved in information disclosure in post Mao China have more Weberian fea-
ture than the bureaucracies in post Mao’s China.
In addition to address the key question about transparency among ruling
elites, broadly this paper relates to the literature on various types of transparency
in authoritarian regime. The focus of the literature has been on mass media
(Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin 2009; Gehlbach and Sonin 2014; King, Pan, and
Roberts 2013; Lorentzen 2014; Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015) and government
disclosure of information to the mass (Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 2015).
The theoretical framework also builds on the notion that elites’ privileged posi-
tions hinge on the stability of their leader’s rule (Besley and Kudamatsu 2007;
De Mesquita 2005; Miquel 2007). Finally, this paper contributes to the research on
bayesian persuasion which studies an agent’s design of the informational envi-
ronment in a setting where the information is ex ante symmetric (Kamenica and
Gentzkow 2011). By incorporating multiple receivers among whom there exists
conflict, this paper offers a theoretical as well as a substantive contribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the benchmark
model where there exits no conflict among the members of ruling group. The
5This assumption that bureaucracy isa commitment device is related to the discussion in the
literature that institutionalization is an instrument that autocrat uses to commit. Particularly,
institutionalized legislative body and party structure are commitment devices for the autocrat to
commit to information sharing (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011; Svolik 2012).
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benchmark aims to capture how the conflict between the incumbent autocrat and
her ruling group leads to the incumbent’s choice over transparency. The model
where the ruling group splits into two factions is presented in section 3. The effect




First, I present a benchmark model where the ruling coalition is coherent. I show
how the autocrat’s political survival incentives affect her decision over trans-
parency of policy effectiveness. The autocrat’s competence determines the ef-
fectiveness of the valence policy. Ex ante both the ruling coalition and autocrat
herself don’t know her competence. The ruling coalition supports the autocrat
when its belief about the autocrat’s competence is strong enough. The ruling
coalition forms belief of autocrat’s competence based on the belief of the policy
effectiveness. If the autocrat’s competence turns out to be low, policy effectiveness
will be low. She could lie about ineffective policy and send a favorable message
indicating that policy is effective. The more often she lies, the more frequent a fa-
vorable message will arrive. However, if she lies more often, a favorable message
will be less convincing, i.e. the ruling coalition’s belief that the autocrat is com-
petent is weaker upon receiving a favorable message. Consequently, the autocrat
lies at a frequency that the ruling coalition is convinced enough to support her
upon receiving a favorable message. When the ruling coalition needs a stronger
belief of the autocrat’s competence to support her, the autocrat’s has to be more
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transparent about ineffective policy and lie less about it.
Players
There is an incumbent autocrat A and a ruling coalition C. The autocrat’s
competence, denoted by θ, could take two values: 0 or 1. It is unknown to the
ruling coalition and the incumbent autocrat herself. Let µ0 be the common prior
probability that the incumbent autocrat’s competence takes a value of 1. The in-
cumbent autocrat cares only about her own political survival. She makes payoffs
of 1 if she stays in office and 0 otherwise. The ruling coalition cares about an
autocrat’s competence. It is more satisfied when the competence is higher. Let µ
be the belief that an autocrat’s competence is 1. The ruling coalition’s expected
payoff is µ if it believes that with probability µ the autocrat’s competence is high.
Selection of the Leadership
The ruling coalition decides whether to retain the incumbent or replace her
with a candidate. Denote its decision by σC ∈ {0, 1}. All players share the com-
mon belief that with probability p that the competence of the candidate is 1. We
consider the case where µ0 < p.6
Information Disclosure
The autocrat’s competence determines the effectiveness of the valence policy:
if her competence is low, the policy is ineffective; if her competence is high, the
policy is effective. With the abuse of notation, let the effectiveness of the valence
policy be θ ∈ {0, 1}. The ruling coalition forms belief of autocrat’s competence
based on its belief of the policy effectiveness. To influence the ruling coalition’s
decision, the autocrat chooses ex ante how information of the policy effectiveness
6 This assumption is to ensure that it is optimal for the autocrat to disclose some information.
If µ0 ≥ p., the ruler doesn’t disclose any information, as the ruling coalition supports her in the
absence of additional information.
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will be disclosed to the elite ex post. Formally, she can choose any conditional
distribution of messages given information. In other words, the autocrat chooses
a format of information disclosure pi which consists of a finite message space
S and a family of distributions {pi(·|θ)}θ∈Θ over S. Later, we will discuss how
each information disclosure means for transparency. The autocrat commits to
this format of information disclosure by structuring the bureaucracy. Once the
bureaucracy is structured, it is costly to implement new format of information
disclosure by introducing a new bureaucracy. This gives commitment power to
the autocrat.
Sequence:
The timing of the game is as follows.
1. The incumbent autocrat A chooses a information disclosure pi.
2. Nature chooses the value of θ.
3. The signal is realized. All players receive the message.
4. The ruling coalition C makes a decision σC.
Solution Concept
This game has a component of imperfect information, so I derive perfect
Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies. Let H be the set of histories before the
ruling coalition C’s choice. The equilibrium consists of strategies: {pi(·|θ)}θ∈Θ,
σC, and beliefs about θ for each history.
2.2.2 Results
The Ruling Coalition’s Decision
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The ruling coalition’s decision to support the autocrat depends on its belief
of the incumbent autocrat’s competence. Given the realization of the signal, the
ruling coalition forms a posterior belief µ. The expected payoff from retaining the
incumbent is µ. Because the candidate is expected be of high competence with
probability p, the expected payoff from replacing the incumbent with a candidate
is p. Therefore, the ruling coalition keeps the incumbent if the posterior µ ≥ p.
The ruling coalition’s decision is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The ruling coalition’s decision over whether to support the incumber
leader is as follows.
σC(µ) =

0 if µ < p
1 if µ ≥ p
(2.1)
The ruling coalition supports the incumbent when its belief that the incum-
bent is competent is above the expected payoff from choosing the candidate. The
higher expected payoff from supporting the candidate, the stronger belief about
the incumbent’s competence is needed to sustain the ruling coalition’s support.
The Autocrat’s Choice of Information Disclosure
When designing the information disclosure, the incumbent autocrat prefers
the message which leads to retainment by the ruling coalition arrives as often as
possible. For any information disclosure pi, given message s ∈ S, the ruling coali-
tion holds a posterior belief µ about the policy effectiveness. Because the com-
petence of the incumbent determines the policy effective, µ is also the posterior
belief about the incumbent’s competence. It retains the incumbent if the posterior
belief of the incumbent’s competence is above its threshold belief, i.e. µ ≥ p, and
replaces her otherwise. We call the message that leads to the retainment favorable
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message, denoted by s+, and the message that leads the replacement unfavorable
message, denoted by s−. If a favorable message arrives, the ruling coalition holds
the belief that the incumbent’s competence is high with probability µ+ ≥ p. If
an unfavorable message arrives, the ruling coalition believes that the incumbent’s
competence is high with probability 0.7 Let the frequency of favorable message
be α. Because the ruling coalition is Bayesian, the more frequent favorable news
arrive (i.e.α is higher), the less convincing favorable news are (µ+ is lower). For-
mally, bayesian rationality requires that the expectation of the posteriors must
equal to the prior:
(1− α)× 0+ α× µ+ = µ0.
To maximize the frequency of favorable message which lead to retainment, the
incumbent disclosures information such that the ruling coalition holds the belief
of the incumbent’s competence µ+ = p upon receiving favorable news.
We construct the optimal information disclosure as follows. The incumbent
will send a favorable message s+ if the competence is high, θ = 1. If the compe-
tence is low, θ = 0, the incumbent sends favorable message s+ with a probability
denoted by pi+0 , and unfavorable news with probability pi
−
0 . In what follows, we
refer the probability that low competence is revealed as unfavorable message as
the level of transparency. Upon receiving the favorable message, elite posterior
belief is
µ0
µ0 + (1− µ0)pi+0
,
The incumbent sets the value of pi+0 such that the above posterior equals to the
elite’s threshold p. It implies that pi+0 =
µ0(1−p)
(1−µ0)p . Therefore, by adopting the fol-
7Otherwise, after s− is realized, the incumbent could construct a further information disclosure
where some realization will lead to retainment and thus benefits from this further information
disclosure.
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lowing information disclosure, the incumbent could achieve her goal of maximiz-
ing the frequency of the message that leads to the ruling coalition’s retainment.
If the competence is high, θ = 1, the incumbent sends favorable message s+; if
the competence is low, θ = 0, the incumbent sends favorable message s+ with
probability µ
0(1−p)
(1−µ0)p , and unfavorable message s
− with probability 1− µ0(1−p)
(1−µ0)p . The
following proposition summarizes the optimal information disclosure. The proof
is in the appendix.
Proposition 1. The incumbent autocrat A constructs the optimal information disclo-
sure pi∗. It includes two possible messages s− and s+ where given s− the posterior µ = 0
and given s+ the posterior µ = p. Let pi−θ be the probability that given the competence θ




1 if θ = 1
µ0(1−p)
(1−µ0)p if θ = 0
(2.2)
and pi−θ = 1− pi+θ , where pi+θ = Pr[s+|θ] and pi−θ = Pr[s−|θ] .
Transparency
The level of transparency associated with the equilibrium information disclo-
sure is characterized as follows.
Proposition 2. Let Pr[s−|θ−] be the the level of transparency associated with the
equilibrium information disclosure. We have
Pr[s−|θ−] = 1− µ
0(1− p)
(1− µ0)p (2.3)
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The transparency level is increasing in p. That is, the incumbent autocrat has
to be more transparent about her incompetence if the ruling coalition requires
a stronger belief about the incumbent’s competence to support her. The trans-
parency is decreasing in µ0. The weaker the prior belief about the incumbent’s
competence, the more transparent she needs to be about her incompetence.
Bureaucratic Quality
In this model, the incumbent commits to her plan of information disclosure.8
That is, the incumbent has to commit that once she learns that the policy is in-
effective which is a direct evidence that she is incompetent, she will still send
unfavorable message with the designed probability.
To make the commitment credible, the incumbent often delegates informa-
tion gathering and reporting to bureaucracies. By structuring bureaucracy, the
incumbent leader could attain a desirable level of transparency. Weberian bureau-
cracy with features such as autonomy, professionalism are more likely to result
in transparency. By choosing a more Weberian like bureaucracy, the incumbent
commits to a high level of transparency in revealing information of ineffective
policy, which directly reflects the incumbent’s incompetence. For example, to
commit to the equilibrium transparency level 1 − µ0(1−p)
(1−µ0)p , the incumbent could




(1−µ0)p corrupted bureaucrat. Both honest and corrupted bureaucrats gen-
erate a favorable message when the competence is high. When the competence
is low, an honest bureaucrat generates a unfavorable message while a corrupted
bureaucrat generates a favorable message. The message generated by the bu-
reaucracy aggregates individual bureaucrats’ messages. The bureaucratic quality
8The incumbent maximizes her political survival by committing to the optimal information
disclosure discussed above.
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could be measured by the proportion of honest bureaucrat in the team, denoted
by q. Therefore, to commit to an equilibrium transparency level, the incumbent
leader chooses a bureaucratic competence q. We have the following proposition
regarding bureaucratic quality.
Proposition 3. In the equilibrium, the ruler L chooses the bureaucratic quality
q∗ = 1− µ
0(1− p)
(1− µ0)p
Because a level of bureaucratic quality implements a level of transparency, the
relationship between the ruling coalition’s threshold belief to support and the
bureaucratic quality is the same as the relationship between the ruling coalition’s
threshold belief to support and the transparency level.
2.3 Model with Divided Ruling Coalition
Now we consider that the ruling coalition are split into two factions, the ruling
faction who shares the incumbent autocrat’s ideology, and the opposition faction
with a differing ideology. With only the ruling faction’s support, the incumbent
stays in office probabilistically. With the opposition’s support, the incumbent
stays in office for sure. In the equilibrium, the incumbent chooses between two
formats of information disclosure. One information disclosure persuades the rul-
ing faction: upon receiving a favorable message, only the ruling faction supports
the ruler. The other information disclosure persuades both the ruling and oppo-
sition factions. As demonstrated in the baseline model, if the members of ruling
coalition need stronger belief about the incumbent’s competence to support the
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incumbent, the incumbent has to be more transparent of policy effectiveness. The
opposition requires a stronger belief to support the incumbent. To persuade the
opposition, the incumbent has to be more transparent of policy effectiveness and
consequently send a favorable message that leads to the retainment by the oppo-
sition less frequently. However, once the opposition is persuaded, the incumbent
stays in office for certain. Therefore, when deciding whether to persuade the
opposition or the ruling faction alone, the incumbent faces a trade-off between
the frequency that a favorable message arrives and the frequency that a favorable
message leads to political survival. We show how aspects of elite division affect
this trade-off and hence the incumbent’s decision whether to be more transparent
to persuade the opposition.
2.3.1 Setup
Players
Consider now that the members of ruling coalition split into two factions:
faction R is the ruling faction and faction O is the opposition faction. In addition
to valence policy, there is policy over which factions have conflicting interest. Let
such policy choice be x ∈ R. Each faction has an ideal policy zi where i ∈ {R, O}.
Faction i’s preference over policies is characterized by a quadratic utility function
ui(x) = −(x− zi)2. Let d be the difference between zR and zO. d thus measures
the interest conflict among two factions. We refer it as ideological conflict.
An autocrat chooses the policy and she is assumed to choose the ideal policy
of her own faction. The value of the autocrat’s competence is unknown to the
ruling coalition and the incumbent autocrat herself. The competence could take
two values, 0 or 1. Factions share the same belief about the competence. Let µ be
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the belief that competence is 1. The expected payoff for group i from an autocrat
whom is believed to be high competence with probability µ is
E(ui(x)) = −(x− zi)2 + µ
The incumbent autocrat A, is a member of ruling faction R. She always chooses
group R’s ideal policy zR. The value of her competence, denoted by θ ∈ {0, 1},
is unknown to the both factions as well as to the herself. All players share a
common prior belief about the incumbent’s valence. Let µ0 be the common prior
probability that A’s competence takes a value of 1.9 The incumbent cares only
about her own political survival. She makes payoffs of 1 if she stays in office and
0 otherwise.
Selection of the Leadership under Divided Ruling Coalition
When the ruling coalition splits into two factions, the incumbent’s political
survival depends on the choices of both factions. All players share the common
belief that with probability 12 that the competence of the ruling faction’s candidate
is 1. The selection of the leadership first starts with the ruling faction R’s decision
whether to retain the incumbent or replace her with a candidate from its own
faction. Denote R’s decision by σR ∈ {0, 1}. After the succession process within
the ruling faction, the opposition has a chance to vie for power. If the opposition
seizes power, it decides whether to replace the politician survived from the ruling
faction’s succession process with its own candidate. All players share the com-
mon belief that with probability 12 that the competence of the opposition faction’s
candidate is 1. Denote O’s decision by σO ∈ {0, 1}. Once the opposition makes
9We impose an assumption on the prior µ0 to ensure that given the prior, the ruling faction
doesn’t support the incumbent. We assume that the prior belief µ0 < −ed2 + 12 . We will be clear
about the definition of e later.
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the decision, the selection process ends. If the opposition doesn’t seize power, the
politician who survives the succession process within the ruling faction becomes
the new autocrat.
The strength of ruling faction and the ruling faction’s dependence on the in-
cumbent affect the selection of leadership. More specifically, if the ruling faction
retains the incumbent, the opposition seizes power with probability 1− ρ. ρ thus
measures the ruling faction’s strength. In the case where the ruling faction’s polit-
ical entrenchment depends on the incumbent, the replacement of the incumbent
erodes the ruling faction’s political entrenchment and increases the chance that
the opposition can seize power. If the ruling faction replaces the incumbent, the
probability that the opposition seizes power is 1− (1− e)ρ. e thus measures the
degree to which the ruling faction’s political entrenchment depends on the in-
cumbent.
Information Disclosure
As in the baseline model, to influence factions’ decisions, the incumbent auto-
crat chooses ex ante how information will be disclosed to the factions ex post.
Sequence:
The timing of the game is as follows.
1. A chooses a information disclosure pi.
2. Nature chooses the value of θ.
3. The signal is realized. All players receive the message.
4. R makes a decision σR.
5. If σR = 1, with probability 1− ρ, O makes a decision σO.
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6. If σR = 0, with probability 1− (1− e)ρ, O makes a decision σO.
Solution Concept
This game has a component of imperfect information, so I derive perfect
Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies. Let H be the set of histories before the
choices of R and O. The equilibrium consists of strategies: {pi(·|θ)}θ∈Θ, σR, σO
and beliefs about θ. For each history, players also have beliefs about θ. All players
share the same prior belief, denoted by µ0. Let µ be the posterior belief after the
realization of the message.
2.3.2 Results
The Opposition Faction’s Decision
When the opposition seizes power, the opposition faction makes a decision
whether to replace the ruling faction’s politician who survives its succession pro-
cess. In the case where a new politician is selected by the ruling faction, the
opposition faction replaces her with a politician from its own group. This is be-
cause a new politician from the ruling faction and a politician from the opposition
faction share the same expected competence while the politician from the oppo-
sition faction represents the ideology of the opposition faction. In the case where
the incumbent autocrat survived the succession process, the opposition faction
faces a trade-off between expected competence and ideology alignment. After
receiving the message, the opposition forms a posterior belief about the incum-
bent’s competence, µ. The expected competence of the incumbent autocrat is thus
µ, which is µ− 1/2 greater than the expected competence of politician from the
its own faction. The difference between the incumbent’s ideology and the oppo-
sition faction’s ideology is d. Based on the trade-off, the opposition retains the
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incumbent if the posterior belief about her competence, µ, is above a threshold
µO ≡ d2 + 12 . We summarize opposition faction’s decision as follows.
Lemma 2. The opposition faction’s decision over whether to support the incumber
autocrat is as follows.
σO(µ) =

0 if σR = 0 or σR = 1 and µ1 < µO
1 if σR = 1 and µ ≥ µO
(2.4)
where µO ≡ d2 + 12 .
The opposition faction always ousts a new politician survived from the suc-
cession process within the ruling faction. It retains the incumbent if its belief that
incumbent is competent is high enough to compensate for the difference between
the incumbent’s ideology and its own ideology.
The Ruling Faction’s Decision
When deciding whether to keep the incumbent, the ruling faction faces dif-
ferent tradeoff when factions’ belief of the incumbent’s competence is in different
range. The belief affects the opposition’s decision and in turn affects the trade-
off faced by the ruling faction. If the belief is strong enough to compensate for
the ideological conflict, the opposition will keep the incumbent if it seizes the
power. Because the ruling faction shares the ideology with the incumbent, it re-
quires a weaker belief to support the incumbent. In the case where the belief of
incumbent’s competence is above the opposition’s threshold, the ruling faction
will support the incumbent. If the belief of incumbent’s competence is below the
opposition’s threshold, the opposition will replace the incumbent with its own
candidate if it seizes the power. The opposition candidate will impose the op-
position’s ideology. In this case, the ruling faction faces a tradeoff. On the one
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hand, replacement of a low competence incumbent increases the payoff in the
valence policy dimension. On the other hand, such replacement of an incumbent
increases the chance that the opposition’s candidate takes over and places its own
candidate who imposes the opposition’s ideology. To avoid the situation that the
other faction’s ideology is implemented, the ruling faction is willing to bear a low
competence incumbent.
If µ ≥ µO, the opposition keeps the incumbent if the incumbent survives the
ruling faction’s succession process. In this case, the ruling faction always sup-
ports the incumbent. That is, the ruling faction never finds it optimal to replace
the incumbent if the belief of her being competent is greater than the opposition’
threshold value. Because ruling faction shares the incumbent’s ideology while
the opposition has a divergent ideology, the strength of the belief of the incum-
bent’s competence that the ruling faction requires is lower than that required by
the opposition faction. Formally, the ruling faction receives an expected payoff of
µ from retaining the incumbent ruler where µ ≥ µO > 12 and an expected payoff
of 12 − (1− (ρ− e))d2 from ousting the incumbent ruler. Notice that replacement
of incumbent reduce the expected payoff from µ to 12 in the valence policy dimen-
sion, and the expected payoff from 0 to −(1− (ρ− e))d2 in ideology dimension.
The payoff from keeping the incumbent is greater than the payoff from ousting
the incumbent, thus the ruling faction supports the incumbent.
If µ < µO, the opposition will place their own candidate when the opposition
seizes power. In this case there exists a tradeoff the ruling faction faces in replac-
ing the incumbent. The ruling faction now expects that given the chance the oppo-
sition faction will replace any politician who has survived the succession process.
The ruling faction makes an expected payoff of E(u0R) ≡ 12 + (1− (ρ− e))(−d2)
from replacing the incumbent with a new politician from its own group, where
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1
2 is the expected payoff in the valence policy dimension and (1− (ρ− e))(−d2)
is the expected payoff in the ideology dimension. It makes an expected payoff
of E(u1R) ≡ ρµ + (1 − ρ)12 + (1 − ρ)(−d2) from keeping the incumbent leader,
where ρµ+ (1− ρ)12 is the expected payoff in the valence policy dimension and
(1 − ρ)(−d2) is the expected payoff in the ideology dimension. The difference
between the two expected payoffs is
E(u0R)− E(u1R) = ρ(
1
2
− µ) + e(−d2)
The first term ρ(12 − µ) captures the possible benefit in the valence policy di-
mension. The second term e(−d2) captures the cost of replacing the incumbent
leader in the ideology dimension. A replacement of the incumbent makes ruling
faction weaker. The opposition faction thus has a better chance to place its politi-
cian as the leader who implements its ideology. This increase in the risk of being
under the rule of the opposition which implements its own ideology is the cost of
the replacement. When the cost of the replacement exceeds the benefit, the rul-
ing faction retains the incumbent. This happens when the belief of incumbent’s
competence is above a threshold µR = −ed2 + 12 . Notice that µR < µO, thus the
ruling faction requires a weaker belief of the incumbent’s competence to support
her than the opposition faction. We summarize the ruling faction’s strategy as
follows.
Lemma 3. The ruling faction’s choice of leadership is as follows.
σR(µ) =

1 if µ ≥ µR
0 otherwise
(2.5)
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where µR = −ed2 + 12 .
The ruling faction supports the incumbent if the belief of her competence is a
above threshold. The ruling faction requires a weaker belief of the incumbent’s
competence as it becomes more dependent on the ruler and as the ideological
conflict between two factions increases. The greater dependence on the ruler,
a larger increase in the risk of being under the opposition’s rule caused by the
replacement. The cost of replacement is higher and thus a weaker belief of the
incumbent’s competence is needed to sustain the ruling faction’s support. The
greater ideological distance, the more fearful the ruling faction would be of the
situation that the other faction’s ideal policy is implemented, and the weaker
belief of the incumbent’s competence is needed to sustain the ruling faction’s
support.
The Autocrat’s Choice of Information Disclosure
The incumbent autocrat can always construct an information disclosure pi with
three messages: one leads to replacement by the both factions, call it unfavorable
message denoted by s−; one to retain by the ruling faction but the replacement by
the opposition faction if it seizes power, call it favorable message denoted by s+;
and other to retain by both the ruling faction and opposition faction if it seizes
power, call it very favorable message denoted by s++. After observing s−, the
factions’ perception of the ruler’s competence must be 0; after observing s+, the
faction’s posterior belief µ+ = µR; and after observing s++, after observing s++,
the faction’s posterior belief µ++ = µO. Let the frequency of favorable message
be αR and the frequency of very favorable message be αO. The incumbent chooses
the frequency of favorable message and frequency of very favorable message to
maximize her chance of political survival. Favorable message lead to the sup-
port of the ruling faction and hence political survival with probability ρ. Very
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favorable message lead to the support of both faction and thus political survival
with certainty. Because the factions are Bayesian, it constraints how much lie the
incumbent could tell. Formally, the factions update belief about the incumbent’s
competence following bayesian rationality which requires that the expectation of




V(pi) = αRρ+ αO.
s.t.αR × µR + αO × µO = µ0.
The incumbent faces trade-off when choosing the frequency of sending fa-
vorable message and very favorable message. If the ruler sends very favorable
message more often (an increases in αO), she has to send favorable news less
often (a decrease in αR). Moreover, because very favorable message is more con-
vincing than a favorable message, if the ruler sends one additional very favorable
message, she has to decrease the favorable message by µOµR > 1. When the very
favorable message arrives, the ruler stays in office for certain. However, very fa-
vorable message has to be more convincing, one degree increase in the frequency
of very favorable message is at the cost of more than one degree decrease in the
frequency of favorable message. We call both favorable message and very fa-
vorable message favorable message. The ruler thus faces trade-off between the
frequency of favorable message and the frequency of political survival upon the
arrival of favorable message.
When the political survival return of sending very favorable news is lower
or equal to it’s cost being less frequent, i.e. 1ρ ≤ µOµR , the ruler chooses to send
zero very favorable message. She sends favorable message which leads to the
retainment only by the ruling faction and least favorable message which lead to
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the replacement. The favorable message will lead to retainment only by the ruling
faction if the ruler adopts the following information disclosure. That is, if the
competence is high, the incumbent sends a favorable message; if the competence






information disclosure aims to only persuade the ruling faction: upon receiving
very favorable message, only the ruling faction supports the incumbent. When the
political survival return of sending very favorable message is higher than it’s cost
being less frequent, i.e. 1ρ <
µO
µR
, the incumbent sends zero favorable message. She
sends very favorable message which leads to the retainment by both factions and
least favorable message which lead to the replacement. The favorable message
will lead to retainment by both factions if the incumbent adopts the following
information disclosure. That is, if the competence is high, the incumbent sends
a very favorable message; if the competence is low, the incumbent sends very





. This information disclosure aims to
persuade the opposition faction as well: upon receiving very favorable message,
opposition also supports the incumbent. The following proposition summarizes
the optimal information disclosure. I show the proof in the appendix.
Proposition 4. If 1ρ ≤ µOµR , the optimal information disclosure, denoted by pi+1 , has
support on {s−, s+}. If the signal realization is s−, the ruling faction replaces the incum-
bent, σR = 0, and the opposition faction replaces the incumbent given the chance, σO = 0.
If the signal realization is s+, the ruling faction retains the incumbent, σR = 1, while the
opposition faction replaces the incumbent given the chance, σO = 0. Let pi+θ = Pr[s
+|θ].














, the optimal information disclosure, denoted by pi++1 , has support on
{s−, s++}. If the signal realization is s−, the ruling faction replaces the incumbent, σR =
0, and the opposition faction replaces the incumbent given the chance, σO = 0. If the signal
realization is s++, the ruling faction retains the incumbent, σR = 1, and the opposition









if θ = 0
(2.7)
where µR ≡ −ed2 + 12 and µO ≡ d2 + 12 .
When the ruling faction is politically strong (ρ is large), when the ruling fac-
tion depends on the incumbent ruler to a large extend (e is large), and when the
ideological conflict between the two factions is large (d is large), the benefit of
sending more frequent favorable message dominates the cost of lower frequency
of political survival upon the arrival of favorable message. When the ruling fac-
tion is politically strong, the incumbent stays in office with a high probability
with only ruling faction’s support. Therefore, the frequency of her political sur-
vival if favorable message persuades only the ruling faction is only a bit lower
than the frequency of political survival if favorable message persuades both fac-
tions. When the ruling faction depends on the incumbent to a large extend, the
ruling faction requires a weak belief to support the incumbent. The incumbent
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thus could send favorable message which persuades only the ruling faction in a
very high frequency. When there exists large ideological conflict among the two
factions, the ruling faction requires a weak belief to support the incumbent while
the opposition faction requires a stronger belief. The distance in the strength of
the beliefs that required by two factions is large. Therefore, the incumbent could
send favorable message that persuades only the ruling faction much more fre-
quently than the favorable message that persuades both factions. As a result, the
incumbent constructs information disclosure to persuade only the ruling faction
under the above conditions.
Transparency
We say that the transparency level is higher if the likelihood of low competence
reported as unfavorable news is higher. We summarize the level of transparency
given parameters that characterize the intra-elite division in the following propo-
sition.













where µR ≡ −ed2 + 12 and µO ≡ d2 + 12 .
Figure B.1 shows how aspects of intra-elite division affect the transparency
level.
In panel A, I show how the ruling faction’s political strength ρ affects trans-
parency. When the ruling faction is politically weak, the incumbent autocrat
would stay in office with low probability if she only persuades the ruling faction.
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As a result, she adopts a more transparent information disclosure to persuade
the opposition faction. When the ruling faction is politically strong, she adopts a
less transparent information disclosure to persuade only the ruling faction. Panel
B shows how the ruling faction’s dependence on the ruler e affects transparency.
When the ruling faction’s dependence on incumbent is small, the ruling faction
requires a strong belief about the incumbent’s competence to support her. Thus,
the ruler is better off adopting a more transparent information disclosure that per-
suade opposition faction. When the ruling faction’s dependence on incumbent is
large, the ruling faction requires a weak belief of the incumbent’s competence. As
a result, the incumbent adopts a less transparent information disclosure to only
persuade the ruling faction. As the ruling faction’s dependence on the incumbent
increases, the information disclosure that persuades only the ruling faction could
be less transparent. Panel C demonstrates the effect of ideological conflict d on
transparency. When the ideological conflict is below a threshold, the opposition
requires a bit stronger belief than the ruling faction to support the incumbent. The
incumbent thus adopts an information disclosure that also persuades the oppo-
sition faction. As the ideological conflict increases, the opposition needs a much
stronger belief than the ruling faction to support the ruler. Consequently, when
the ideological conflict is above a threshold, the incumbent finds it no longer op-
timal to persuade the opposition and thus adopts an information disclosure that
only persuades the ruling faction. As the ideological conflict increases, the in-
cumbent structures a less transparent information disclosure to persuade a ruling
faction who supports the incumbent based on a weaker belief.
Bureaucratic Quality
As discussed in the baseline model with coherent group, one way to commit
to a form of information disclosure is to delegate the information disclosure to
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the bureaucracy. To commit to a more transparent information disclosure, the
ruler delegates the information disclosure to a bureaucracy with higher quality.
We summarize the bureaucratic quality in the following proposition.












where µR ≡ −ed2 + 12 and µO ≡ d2 + 12 .
Figure B.2 shows how aspects of the intra-elite conflict affect the bureaucratic
quality. Because a bureaucracy of a certain level of quality implements an infor-
mation disclosure of certain transparency level, the pattern between the aspects
of elite division and the bureaucratic quality is the same as the pattern between
the aspects of intra-elite conflict and transparency.
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the disclosure of information of policy effectiveness in au-
tocracies. I develop a framework that focuses on the intra-elite conflict and the
autocrat’s political survival incentives. The model shows that among feasible in-
formation disclosures, the autocrat’s choice boils down to two formats: one aims
to persuade the ruling faction to support her and the other aims to also persuade
the opposition faction. If the autocrat adopts an information disclosure that aims
to persuade the ruling faction, she could send favorable message which leads to
ruling faction’s support more frequently; however the success in persuading the
ruling faction does not necessarily lead to political survival. The autocrat faces a
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trade-off between frequency of favorable message and the frequency of political
survival upon a favorable message.
The framework demonstrates how the strength of the ruling faction, the rul-
ing faction’s dependence on the ruler, and policy disagreement between the ruling
faction and the opposition faction affect the autocrat’s design of the information
disclosure among members of ruling coalition and consequently level of trans-
parency. In addition, the frameworks has implication on bureaucratic quality in
autocracies where the autocrat structures bureaucracies that gather and report
information.
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Chapter 3
Political Polarization and Policy
Expertise
3.1 Introduction
Political polarization, both at the elite and the mass level, is an increasingly salient
problem.1 In particular, most of the research in political science has been focused
on the consequences of growing party polarization at elite level for policy mak-
ing.2 However, our understanding of how political polarization at the mass level
affects politicians’ policy decisions is rather limited. The premise behind dele-
gation in democracy is that politicians are usually expected to have expertise in
policy making. This expertise is particularly important for all voters in common
value issues where they share the same preference.
In this paper, I examine the relationship between political polarization at the
mass level and politicians’ decisions regarding common value issue. The existing
theory of policymaking in common value issue studies an environment with ho-
mogenoues voters sharing the same ideology (Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts
1see Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006 and Fiorina and Abrams 2008 for the review of the
literature on polarization.
2see Lee 2015 for the review of the literature on how party polarization affects governace.
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2001; Majumdar and Mukand 2004; Maskin and Tirole 2004). It is thus unable
to explain politicians’ decisions in common value issue where the electorate is
divided by voters’ opposing ideologies.3
The model is motivated by a problem voters face when choosing politicians.
First, compared to voters’ information about politicians’ ideological positions, vot-
ers might have poorer information about politicians’ competence. Party affilia-
tions provide information on politicians’ ideological positions (Downs 1957; Cox
and McCubbins 1993; Snyder Jr and Ting 2002). Information about politician’s
competence is often obscure (Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts 2001). Second, to
assess politicians’ competence based on their policy choices, voters face a chal-
lenge. Voters often don’t have policy expertise to know what is the best policy for
them. As a result, given a policy choice by a politician, voters’ assessment of the
politician’s competence is complicated by their beliefs of what is the best policy
for them.
Given the above, I analyze an accountability model where candidates’ ideolog-
ical positions are known and their competence in policy making in common value
issues is private information, and voters are ex ante uncertain about which policy
choice in common value issue is best for them. In this model, voters are divided
into two groups with differing ideological positions. Candidates representing two
groups’ ideologies compete for the office. Candidates’ competence in policy mak-
ing in common value issues are private information. The incumbent has access
to information regarding common value issues. A competent politician is able to
process information better than an incompetent one. Observing the incumbent’s
3McMurray 2017 studies how voters’ opposing beliefs of the common value issue affect elec-
toral outcomes. Different from the setting in his paper, in my setting voters share the same belief
in common value issue and they have opposing ideologies in an issue other than the common
value issue.
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policy choice, each group makes a choice between two candidates. Groups’ vot-
ing decisions aggregate to the election outcome. I study two variations of such
aggregation. First, there is a majority and a minority among the two groups. The
majority group’s voting decision determines the election result. In this case, the
incumbent knows the ideology of the decisive group who determines her career
future. Second, society is composed of two competitive groups. If only one group
votes for the incumbent, she wins with probability 1/2. It is effectively that the
incumbent is uncertain about the ideology of the decisive group.
The incumbent faces a decision between exercising her policy expertise and
pandering. She exercises her policy expertise if she makes policy decisions ac-
cording to her policy information. She panders if she chooses a popular policy
when her policy information suggests the opposite. For voters who believe a
particular policy is likely to be best for them, a popular policy choice is a posi-
tive signal of the incombent’s competence and an unpopular choice is a negative
signal of her competence. If the ideological polarization is high, voters’ beliefs
about the incumbent’s competence won’t matter for their voting decision and the
incumbent thus has no incentives to pander. Only when the ideological polar-
ization is not too high, the reputation about valence matters for voter’s voting
decision. When the reputation about valence matters for voters’ voting decision,
the analysis produces two main contributions.
First, I show that regardless of whether the decisive group is the incumbent’s
partisan voter or not, the incumbent is more likely to exercise her policy expertise
as ideological polarization increases. As the ideological polarization increases,
the partisan voter still votes for the incumbent even if the negative signal of her
competence is very informative and the opponent voter votes for the incumbent if
the positive signal of her competence is very informative. The more the incumbent
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exercises her policy expertise, the more informativeness is the policy choice as
a signal of the incumbent’s competence. As a result, a re-election concerned
incumbent excerises her policy expertise more when the ideology polarization is
higher.
Second, when the polarization level is low, pandering equilibrium exists re-
gardless whether the incumbent knows which group is decisive. However, the
patterns between level of polarization and pandering probability are different
in an environment where the incumbent knows which group is decisive and an
environment where she is uncertain of which group is decisive. In the latter en-
vironment, as the level of polarization increases, the pandering probability first
decreases then jumps to a higher level and then decreases again. This result is due
to the incumbent’s switching from pandering to her partisan voters to pandering
to her opponent. This result contributes directly to the literature that studies how
an agent’s reputation concern causes inefficient decision making (Scharfstein and
Stein 1990; Prendergast and Stole 1996). Contrary to the canonical setting where
the ideology of the principal (the principal being voters in my setting) is known,
I consider an environment where the agent (the agent being the incumbent in my
setting) is uncertain of the principal’s ideology.
In addition, the paper contributes broadly to a line of research that studies
how institutions of accountability affect politician’s performance. This literature
starts from the seminal works of Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986, and Austen-Smith and
Banks 1989 to more recent development by Alesina and Tabellini 2007, Alesina
and Tabellini 2008, Besley and Coate 2003, and Maskin and Tirole 2004. Along
this line of research, the paper speakes directly to the pandering literature which
studies how electoral incentives affect decisions by politicians who have private
policy information. In addition to early contributions by Canes-Wrone, Herron,
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and Shotts 2001, Maskin and Tirole 2004 and Prat 2005, recent work by Morelli
and Van Weelden 2013, Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin 2013 and Kartik, Squintani,
and Tinn 2015 contributes to our understanding of the topic. In what follows
I first describe the basic model. The results of two variations of elections are




The model has two periods t ∈ {1, 2}. In each period, there is a state of the world
ωt ∈ {a, b}, which represents information regarding a valence policy. The periods
are independent. The prior belief is that Pr(ωt = a) = pi > 12 . In a given period,
the politician in office receives a signal st ∈ {a, b} regarding the state of the world
ωt. There are two types of politicians, type T ∈ {L, H}. High competence politi-
cian receives perfect information. The signal that a high competence politician
receives matches the state of the world, i.e. st = ωt. Low competence politician
receives information with a lower precision. The signal that a low competence
politician receives matches the state of the world with a probability ρ ∈ (pi, 1), i.e.
Pr(st = ωt) = ρ.4 After receiving signal, the politician in office makes a policy
choice xt ∈ {A, B}.
4The assumption ensures that given the signal b the belief that the state of the world w = b is
greater than the belief that the state of the world w = a, i.e. Pr(ω = b|s = b) > Pr(ω = a|s = b).
The signal received by low competence politician is informative under this assumption. This
assumption doesn’t affect the equilibrium results. This assumption is to capture the idea that
politicians have policy expertise in policy making.
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Players
There are four players in the model: an incumbent politician I, a challenger C
and two groups of voters. Let one group be group L and the other be group
R. Group L has an ideology zL and group R has an ideology zR. Candidates
represent two groups in ideology dimension. Let the incumbent’s ideology be zI
and the challenger’s ideology be zC. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the incumbent represents group L and the challenger represents group R. Thus,
zI = zL and zC = zR. This is known to all players. The politician’s competence is
her private information. Group L and group R share the same prior belief about
the incumbent’s competence type and challenger’s competence type. Ex ante they
believe that the incumbent and the challenger are of the same competence. The
probability that a politician is high competence is κ ∈ (0, 1). All players share the
same preference in valence policy. They derive a payoff of gt = 1 if xt = ωt; a
payoff of gt = 0 otherwise.
Politicians derive utilities only when they are in office.5 Let zt be the ideol-
ogy of the politician in office at time t. The payoff function of a politician with
ideology zj at period t, denoted by vtj where j ∈ {I, C}, is as follows.
vtj = I
t(−(zt − zj)2 + gt) ,
where gt = 1 if st = ωt, gt = 0 otherwise, and It = 1 if j is in the office, It = 0
otherwise.
Voters derive utilities over the two periods. The payoff function of voter with
ideology zi at period t denoted by uti where i ∈ {L, R} is as follows.
uti = −(zt − zi)2 + gt,
5The assumption that a politician receives positive utility only when she is in office is a standard
assumption in the literature. This assumption allows us to capture the idea that a politician
exercises policy expertise in the second period and distortion in the first-period policy making is
caused by her electoral concern.
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where gt = 1 if st = ωt, gt = 0 otherwise.
All players discount future payoff. We assume the discount factor β→ 1.
Election
The incumbent makes policy decision x1 in the first period. Groups observe the
policy decision x1. Then they decide whether to keep the incumbent or replace
her with the challenger. Let group i’s decision be σi, where i ∈ {L, R}. σi = 1 if
group i re-elects the incumbent and σi = 0 if it removes the incumbent. In the
second period, the elected politician makes the policy decision x2. For the election
result we consider two variations. First, one group of the voter is the majority. The
majority’s voting decision determines the election result. Second, the election is
competitive and there is no clear majority group. The election results based on
the voting decision is as follows.
σ =

0 σL = 0 and σR = 0
.5 σL = 1 or σR = 1
1 σL = 1 and σR = 1
We summarize the timing as follows.
Timing
1. Nature determines the competence of the incumbent and challenger.
2. Nature determines the first period state of the world ω1.
3. The incumbent I receives a signal s1.
4. The incumbent I makes a policy choice x1.
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5. Group i makes a voting decision σi.
6. Nature determines the second period state of the world ω2.
7. The elected politician receives a signal s2.
8. The elected politician makes a policy choice x2.
Solution Concept
This is a Bayesian extensive game where the incumbent signals her comeptence
type to the electorate via her policy decision. We use perfect Bayesian equilibrium
as a solution concept. It includes the incumbent’s policy decision strategy, the
groups’ voting strategies, and groups’ beliefs about the incumbent’s type.
For the incumbent in the first period, the incumbent receives a signal s1 = a
or s1 = b. Let δTs1 ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that a type T ∈ {L, H} incumbent
who receives signal s1 ∈ {a, b} chooses policy x1 = A . For the politician in the
second period, let φTs2 ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that a type T ∈ {L, H} politician
who receives signal s2 ∈ {a, b} chooses policy x2 = A .
For a high-competence politician, let the belief of the state of the world wt after
receieving signal st be θH(wt|st). For a low-competence politician, let the belief of
the state of the world wt after receieving signal st be θL(wt|st).
Let group i’s voting strategy given policy x1 be σi(x1) and their beliefs about
the incumbent is high competence be µx1 .
3.2.2 Second Period Decision
In the second period, the politician in office chooses a policy that gives her the
highest expected payoff. The signal is perfect informative for a high-competence
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politician. The signal is informative even for the low-competence politician. There-
fore, both types of politician follow the signal. φTa = 1 and φTb = 0 for T ∈ {L, H}.
If the high-competence politician is in the office, she always makes a correct de-
cision and the expected valence policy payoff is 1 in the second period. If the
low-competence politician is in office, her decision is correct with probability ρ
and thus the expectd valence policy payoff is ρ in the second period.
3.2.3 A Society of Majority Group and Minority Group
Now we consider the equilibrium when there is a clear majority and minority
group in the society. The majority’s voting decision determines who will be in
office. In the first period, when making policy decision, the incumbent is con-
cerned with her electoral outcome. In an election with a clear majority group and
minority group, there are two possibilities faced by the incumbent: her partisan
voters are the majority and hence the decisive group or her opponent voters are
the majority and hence the decisive group. We analyse both variations.
Consider a high-competence politician. When deciding whether to follow the
signal, she trades off the current period policy payoff and the next period payoff.
The potential payoff gain from choosing policy in the second period never out-
weighs the loss incurred by choosing the wrong first-period policy. Therefore, the
high type always follow the signal in the first period. δHa = 1 and δHb = 0.
The low type politician’s strategy in the first period is more complicated. To
set up the equilibrium, we first develop the following lemma.If the incumbent
follows the policy signal, let the posterior beliefs of the incumbent valence type
given policy choice A be µ and the posterior beliefs of the incumbent valence type
given the policy choice B be µ.
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Lemma 1. 6
µ < κ < µ.
This lemma follow directly from Bayes’ rule. The low competence type is
systematically more likely to receive policy signal b. If both types follow a policy
signal, a policy A is more likely from a high competent incumbent and a policy
B is more likely from a low competent incumbent. Therefore, a policy choice A
serves as a positive signal for the incumbent’s competence and a policy choice
B serves as a negative signal for the incumbent’s competence. When both types
follow policy signals, policy choices are most informative about the incumbent’s
type. If the incumbent adopts a policy making strategy other than following
policy signals, policy choices will be less informative about her competence.
There are two types of of equilibria, the expertise-exercising equilibria and the
pandering equilibria. In the expertise-exercising equilibria, both types of politi-
cian follow policy signals. In the pandering equilibria, the high competence politi-
cian follows policy signals, and the low competence politician follows signal a and
follows signal b with a probability less than 1. We given the following definition.
Definition 1 An expertise-exercising equilibrium is an equilibrium in which δHa =
δLa = 1 and δHa = δLa = 0. A pandering equilibrium is an equilibrium in which δHa =
δLa = 1, δHa = 0, and δLa ∈ [0, 1).
The Incumbent Represents the Majority Group
Now suppose the incumbent’s partisan voters are the decisive group. When de-
ciding whether to exercise expertise or to pander, the incumbent only needs to
consider her partisan voters’ decision.
6As long as the high competent type receives more precise signal than the low competent type,
this result holds.
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The incumbent’s partisan voter trades off between ideology alignment and
competence. If the ideology distance between two groups d ≥ κ − µ, there is
an expertise-exercising equilibrium. Even if the incumbent has the worst valence
reputation µ, the ideology distance between two groups is large enough that her
partisan voter prefers the incumbent who shares the same ideology. The low com-
petence incumbent hence exercises her expertise since whether pandering or not
won’t affect her electoral outcome. If the ideology distance between two groups
d < κ − µ, there is a pandering equilibrium. When the low incompetence incum-
bent receives a signal that suggests an unpopular policy, if she exercises policy
expertise and chooses the policy according to the policy signal, her reputation
will be µ. The ideology distance between two groups is low so that her partisan
voter prefers the candidate from the other group who might have a higher com-
petence level. If she panders and chooses the popular policy A instead, she might
be able to increase her reputation and get re-elected. The incumbent chooses
the likelihood of pandering such that the negative signal of her competence is
not too informative that her partisan voter still votes for her for their ideologi-
cal alignment. We have the following proposition characterizing the incumbent’s
equilibrium strategy in the first period. We provide the complete characterization
of the equilibrium and proof in the appendix.
Proposition 1. In the case where the incumbent shares the majority voter’s ideology, we
have the following unique equilibrium given the parameters.
If the political polarization level d ≥ κ − µ, there is an expertise-exercising equilib-
rium.
If the political polarization level d < κ − µ, there is a pandering equilibrium. The
probability that a low competence incumbent panders is decreasing in the level of polar-
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ization d.
In the case where the incumbent’s ideology is aligned with the majority voter,
pandering equilibrium exists when the polarization level is low. In the low level
polarization, as the polarization increases, the pandering probability decreases.
As the ideological polarization increases, the partisan voter still votes for incum-
bent even if the negative signal of her competence is very informative. The less
the incumbent panders, the more informative the negative signal is. Therefore, as
the ideological polarization increases, the incumbent can pander less.
The Incumbent Represents the Minority Group
Now consider the case where the incumbent represents the minority group. The
decisive voter is the incumbent’s opponent. If the ideology distance d ≥ µ− κ,
there is an expertise-exercising equilibrium. Even the best reputation that incum-
bent could obtain, µ, cannot compensate the ideology difference. The incumbent
thus has no incentive to pander to increase her reputation. If the ideology distance
d < µ− κ, there is a pandering equilibrium. When receiving a positive signal of
her competence, the opponent voter votes for the incumbent if her reputation in
valence dimension is high enough to compensate the ideology distance between
them. In order to get elected, the incumbent panders as much as she can to de-
liver such a positive signal. We have the following proposition characterizing the
incumbent’s equilibrium strategy in the first period. We provide the complete
characterization of the equilbrium and proof in the appendix.
Proposition 2. In the case where the incumbent shares the minority voter’s ideology, we
have the following unique equilibrium given the parameters.
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If the political polarization level d ≥ µ− κ, there is an expertise-exercising equilib-
rium.
If the political polarization level d < µ − κ, there is a pandering equilibrium. The
probability that a low competence incumbent panders is decreasing in the level of polar-
ization d.
The same results in an environment where the incumbent represents the ma-
jority voter still hold here: pandering equilibrium exits when the polarization
level is low; in the low level polarization, as the polarization increases, the pan-
dering probability decreases. The results hold for a logic different from that in the
setting where the incumbent represnts the majority. In order to get elected by the
opponent, the incumbent panders to deliver a positive signal that could convince
the opponent. As the ideological poalrization increases, a positive signal needs to
be more informative to convince the opponent voter. The incumbent thus has to
pander less to make the positive signal more informative.
3.2.4 A Society of Competitive Groups
When a society is composed of two competitive groups, the election is competi-
tive. The incumbent often doesn’t know which group will be decisive in election.
Based on how her reputation affects her electoral outcomes, the incumbent makes
a decision over whether to exercise expertise or to pander. The incumbent knows
if her reputation is µ the probability of being re-elected is as follows.
σ =

0 µ ≤ κ − d
.5 µ ∈ (κ − d, κ + d)
1 µ ≥ κ + d
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In this situation, three levels of political polarization shape different strategic
situations. In order to establish the range that characterizes the three level of
polarizations, we first develop the following lemma. If the incumbent follows
policy signals, the posterior belief given the policy choice A, denoted by µ, and
the posterior belief given the policy choice B, denoted by µ.
Lemma 2. µ− κ < κ − µ.
The above lemma describes the degree of voters’ belief updating when the
incumbent’s policy decisions are most informative about her competence type.
The degree of belief update given policy A is smaller than the degree of belief
update given policy B. In other words, a negative signal of competence is more
informative than a positive signal of competence. Because ex ante the state of the
world is more likely to be ω1 = a, policy A is ex ante more likely to happen.
Consequently, the voter updates less when they observe policy A.
If the polarization level high, d ≥ κ − µ, it must be that d > µ− κ according
to Lemma 2. At this high polarization level, the incumbent’s partisan voter will
vote for the incumbent even given the worst valence reputation possible while
the incumbent’s opponent voter will not vote for the incumbent even given the
best valence reputation possible. Pandering which changes the incumbent’s rep-
utation in the range between the worst and best valence reputation doesn’t affect
the voting behavior of both groups. The incumbent thus has no incentives to
pander. Therefore, in the high polarization level, there is an expertise-exercising
equilibrium.
If the polarization level is intermediate such that µ− k < d < κ − µ, the in-
cumbent’s partisan voter won’t vote for the incumben given the worst valence
reputation possible while the incumbent’s opponent voter won’t vote for the in-
cumbent even given the best valence reputation possible. The incumbent partisan
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voter, however, will vote for the incumbent for a better reputation. The incum-
bent thus has incentives to pander in order to win the votes from her own partisan
group.
If the polarization level is low, d ≤ µ− κ, it must be that d < κ − µ according
to Lemma 2. At this low polarization level, the incumbent’s partisan voter won’t
vote for the incumbent given the worst valence reputation possible but will vote
for the incumbent for a better reputation. The incumbent’s opponent voter will
vote for the incumbent given the best valence reputation possible. The incumbent
has incentives to pander to increase her reputation in valence dimension.
In the low level of polarization, the incumbent considers two types of pander-
ing strategies: either choosing a likelihood of pandering such that only the parti-
san voter vote for the incumbent or choosing a likelihood of pandering such that
both groups vote for the incumbent when observing the popular policy. When
the incumbent receives a policy signal that suggests an unpopular policy, the ben-
efit of being elected is greater than the benefit from informative decision making.
Therefore, the incumbent chooses the pandering strategy that maximizes her elec-
toral probability. If the incumbent panders to her own partisan voter, her partisan
voter votes for her regardless of the policy choice, and thus she gets elected by
probability 1/2. If the incumbent panders to the opponent voter, both groups vote
for her only when they observe the popular policy, and her chance of re-election
is the probability that she panders. Consequently, the incumbent panders to the
partisan voter if the optimal probability of pandering to the opponent is less than
1/2. Otherwise, she panders to the opponent voter. Because the optimal prob-
ability of pandering to the opponent is decreasing in the polarization. We show
that the incumbent panders to the partisan voter when the polarization level is
above a threshold and then panders to the opponnet when the polarization level
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is below that threshold. Given the same level of polarization, the incumbent’s pol-
icy choice as a signal for her competence is less informative when the incumbent
panders to the partisan voter. As a result, at the threshold, when the incumbent
switches to pander to the opponent, the probability of pandering drops.
We have the following proposition characterizing the incumbent’s equilibrium




2(pi(1− ρ) + (1− pi)ρ) + piρ+ (1− pi)(1− ρ) + piκ
− 1)κ
. We provide the complete characterization of the equilbrium and proof in the
appendix.
Definition 2. We define two kinds of pandering equilibria. We say that the incum-
bent who represents group L panders to her partisn voter if σL(A) = 1 and σR(A) = 0.
We say that she panders to opponent if σL(A) = 1 and σR(A) = 1.
Proposition 3. In the case where both groups are competitive, we have the following
unique equilibrium given the parameters.
If the political polarization level d ≥ κ − µ, there is an expertise-exercising equilib-
rium.
If the political polarization level d ∈ (dˆ, κ − µ), there is a pandering equilibrium. A
low competence incumbent panders to her partisan voter.
If the political polarization level d ≤ dˆ, there is a pandering equilibrium. A low
competence incumbent panders to her opponent.
The probability that a low competence incumbent panders is decreasing in the level of
polarization d for d < dˆ, and for d ∈ (dˆ, κ − µ).
In the society where the incumbent knows the ideology preference of the ma-
jority and the society where the incumbent is uncertain of which group is decisive,
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pandering equilibrium exits when the polarization level is low. The comparative
statics results are slightly different. In the society with a clear majority group, in
the range of low level polarization, as the polarization increases, the pandering
probability decreases. In the society with two competitive groups, in the range
of low level polarization, as the polarization increases, the pandering probability
first decreases then it jumps to a higher level and then it decreases again.
3.3 Conclusion
How accountability affects politicians’ behaviour is a key discussion in the re-
search on political institution. Given the important role of political polarization
in politics, it is crucial to understand how political polarization affects the impact
of accountability on politicians. This paper develops a model to analyze the effect
of political polarization at the mass level on the re-election-concerned politicians’
decision. The paper shows that a politician is more likely to exercise her policy
expertise and less likely to pander to the electorate in a society with a higher level
of political polarization at the mass level. This result holds in two variations of
societies. One with a clear majority and a minority group and the other with two
competitive groups. The effect of polarization level on the level of pandering is
slightly different across these two societies. In the former, as political polarization
increases, the level of pandering decreases. In the latter, as polarization increases,
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Figures
Figure A.1: The Effect of High-powered Incentives with One Agent
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Figure A.2: The Principal’s Choice with One Agent
APPENDIX A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1 88
Figure A.3: The Effect of High-powered Incentives with Two-Agent
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Figure A.4: The Principal’s Choice with Two-Agent
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Figure A.5: Comparison of Incentive Structures
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A.2 Proofs
Proof. Remark 1 Solving Equation (5) gives the result in remark 1. Given the
range of λ and γ, the minimum value of al1 is 0 and its maximum value is
11
16 .
Thus, al1 ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Remark 2 Solving Equation (6) gives the result in remark 2. The minimum
value of ah1 is 0 and its maximum value is
22
31 . Thus, a
h
1 ∈ [0, 1].







1− λ22 12(1− γ2)
− (1+ (1− γ2)λ
2
)) ≥ 0






Proof. Remark 3 Solving equation system (7) gives the result in remark 3. The
minimum value of ali is 0 and its maximum value is
11
19 . Thus, a
l
i ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Remark 4 Solving equation system (8) gives the result in remark 4. The





ahi ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Proposition 2 Solving the following equation system gives the results in
proposition 2.
−(1− 38λ2(1− γ2)) +
√
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Proof. Off Equilibrium Beliefs
A observes her own action. It is reasonable to suppose that A updates belief
about the experimental policy according to Bayes’ rule. Now consider P’s off-
equilibrium beliefs. I prove that to sustain Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium derived in
the main section no restriction on P’s off-equilibrium beliefs is required. In other
words, given any belief that P might hold off-equilibrium, A has no incentive to
deviate from his equilibrium action.
Low-Powered Office Incentives
Consider the subgame where low-powered incentives are introduced.
Suppose A deviates to a1. Following a failure and a success, A forms correct





.5(1− a1) + .5 < γ
ρs1A = 1 > γ
If P forms correct beliefs, she chooses p2 = 0 following a failure and p2 = 1
following a success. A makes a payoff of (λγ)
2
2 in period 2 if the experimental fails
and a payoff of λ
2
2 if it succeeds.
Now, consider the off-equilibrium beliefs for P. If a failure is observed, P’s
off-equilibrium belief is denoted by ρ f1P, and a success ρ
s
1P. To break ties, I assume
that P adopts status quo policy if her expected payoff of status quo policy equals
to that of the experimental policy. So, P chooses p2 = 1 only if her belief that the
probability of the experimental policy being effective is greater than γ. Given P’s
decision rule in period 2, I classify P’s off-equilibrium beliefs into four cases.
1. ρ f1P ≤ γ and ρs1P > γ. P makes the same policy decision as she would
have if her beliefs are correct. Thus, A receives the same payoff in this case as the
payoff he could have received when the principal forms correct beliefs.
2. ρ f1P ≤ γ and ρs1P ≤ γ. If the experiment fails, P makes the same policy deci-
sion as she would have if her beliefs are correct. If the experiment succeeds, given
the off-equilibrium belief, P adopts the status quo policy in period 2. A knows
that the experimental policy is effective. But his judgement won’t matter because
the experimental policy won’t be adopted. A puts an effort of λγ and makes a
payoff of (λγ)
2
2 . It is less than what he could have made when the principal forms
correct beliefs.
3. ρ f1P > γ and ρ
s
1P > γ. If the experiment succeeds, P makes the same policy
decision as she would have if her beliefs are correct. If the experiment fails, given
the off-equilibrium belief, P adopts the experimental policy in period 2. A knows
that the experimental policy is effective with probability ρ f1A, so he exerts an effort





2 . A thus makes less than than what he could
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have when the principal forms correct beliefs.
4. ρ f1P > γ and ρ
s
1P ≤ γ. P makes the opposite policy decision from what she
would have made if her beliefs are correct. It is clear that A makes less than than
the payoff he could have received when the principal forms correct belief.
I have shown that for any effort deviating from the equilibrium effort, a1 6= al1,
under any beliefs that P might hold off-equilibrium, A doesn’t make a higher
payoff than the payoff he receives in the situation where P forms correct beliefs.
Thus, I prove that given any off-equilibrium belief of P’s, A doesn’t receive higher
payoff than she would have received in equilibrium.
High-Powered Office Incentives
Now consider the subgame where high-powered office incentives are chosen.
Use the same proof strategy as the one in the low-powered office incentives sub-
game. It could be proved that given any belief that P might hold off-equilibrium
A has no incentives to deviate. Two things are worth mentioning. First, if the
experiment fails, A makes a payoff of 0 regardless of P’s belief. Second, if the
experiment succeeds, given A’s effort a1, the probability that A staying office and
receiving office value is 12 a1 regardless of P’s belief. P’s off-equilibrium belief
affects A’s payoff only by affecting A’s office value in period 2, which has been
discussed in subgame with low-powered office incentives.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Figures
Figure B.1: Elite Division and Transparency
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Figure B.2: Elite Division and Bureaucratic Competence
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Figure B.3: Design of Optimal Signal ρ(1)µR >
1
µO
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Figure B.4: Design of Optimal Signal ρ(1)µR ≤ 1µO
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B.2 Proofs
Proof. Proposition 1 When the elite E holds some belief µ, it takes action σE(µ)
according to their optimal decision derived in equation (1) and lead to an expected
payoff for the incumbent, denoted by vˆ(µ). An information disclosure pi induces
a distribution of posterior beliefs, denoted by τ(µ). The incumbent’s payoff from
any information disclosure is thus the expectation of vˆ under τ. Because the elite
updates belief following a bayesian rule, the expected posterior belief must equals








To solve the above problem, first we derive vˆ(µ), i.e. the expected payoff
for the incumbent leader given some belief µ. When µ < µE, the elite replaces
the incumbent. When µ ≥ µE, the ruling faction keeps the incumbent and the
incumbent stays in office. In summary, we have
vˆ(µ) =
{
0 if µ < µE
1 if µ ≥ µE
(B.1)
where µE ≡ 12 .
I follow the concave-closure approach developed by Kamenica and Gentzkow
2011 to solve the optimization problem. Let V be the concave closure of vˆ:
V(µ) ≡ sup{z|(µ, z) ∈ co(vˆ)}
where co(vˆ) denotes the convex hull of the graph of v.
V(µ) is the largest payoff L can achieve with any format of information dis-
closure when the prior is µ. If (µ,, z) ∈ co(vˆ), then there exits a distribution of
posteriors τ such that Eτµ = µ
′
and Eτ vˆ(µ) = z. Thus, co(vˆ) is the set of (µ, z)
such that if the prior is µ, there exits an information disclosure with value z.
Hence, V(µ) is the largest payoff L can achieve with any signal when the prior is
µ.
The elite updates belief of the competence following bayesian rationality which
requires that the expectation of the posteriors must equal to the prior. We must
have
(1− α)× 0+ α× µE = µ0.
This implies that α = µ
0
µE
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posterior belief is µE and with probability 1− α = 1− µ
0
µE
the posterior belief is 0.
α is the probability that the incumbent stays in office.
Now, we could compute the optimal information disclosure pi∗ which leads
to the above distributions of posteriors. Let pi−θ = Pr[s
−|θ], i.e. the probability
that the realization is s− given the competence θ and pi+θ = Pr[s
+|θ], i.e. the
probability that the realization is s+ given the competence θ. After observing s−,
the elite’s perception of the ruler’s competence is 0. This implies that pi−1 = 0
and consequently pi+1 = 1, i.e. given high competence the internal information
system always generates a relatively favorable message. After observing s+, the




µ0 + (1− µ0)pi+0
,
which implies that pi+0 =
µ0(1−p)
(1−µ0)p .
Proof. Proposition 2 When faction i holds some belief µ, it takes action σi(µ) ac-
cording to their optimal decision derived in equation (1) and (2) and lead to an
expected payoff for the incumbent, denoted by vˆ(µ). An information disclosure pi
induces a distribution of posterior beliefs, denoted by τ(µ). The incumbent’s pay-
off from any information disclosure is thus the expectation of vˆ under τ. Because
the factions update beliefs following a bayesian rule, the expected posterior belief








To solve the above problem, first we derive vˆ(µ), i.e. the expected payoff for
the incumbent given some belief µ. When µ < µR, the ruling faction replaces
the incumbent and so does the opposition if it has a chance to. The incumbent
is ousted for sure. When µ ∈ [µR, µO), the ruling faction keeps the incumbent
and the opposition ousts the incumbent if it has a chance to. The ruling faction’s
decision determines the leadership if there is no political shock. The incumbent
thus stays in office with probability ρ. That is, the greater political entrenchment
of ruling faction with the incumbent in power, the higher probability that the
ruling faction’s leadership decision will be the society’s decision. When µ ≥ µO,
the ruling faction keeps the incumbent and so does the opposition faction. The
incumbent stays in office with certainty. In summary, we have
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vˆ(µ) =

0 if µ < µR
ρ if µ ∈ [µR, µO)
1 if µ ≥ µO
(B.2)
where µR ≡ −ed2 + 12 and µO ≡ d2 + 12 .
I follow the concave-closure approach developed by Kamenica and Gentzkow
2011 to solve the optimization problem. Let V be the concave closure of vˆ:
V(µ) ≡ sup{z|(µ, z) ∈ co(vˆ)}
where co(vˆ) denotes the convex hull of the graph of v.
V(µ) is the largest payoff L can achieve with any format of information dis-
closure when the prior is µ. If (µ,, z) ∈ co(vˆ), then there exits a distribution of
posteriors τ such that Eτµ = µ
′
and Eτ vˆ(µ) = z. Thus, co(vˆ) is the set of (µ, z)
such that if the prior is µ, there exits an information disclosure with value z.
Hence, V(µ) is the largest payoff L can achieve with any signal when the prior
is µ. The concave-closure approach shows that there are two formats of optimal
information disclosure. When certain condition is satisfied, the incumbent ruler
chooses one as oppose to the other.
Figure B. 3 shows the function vˆ, the concave closure V , and the information
disclosure when ρµR >
1
µO
. Figure B.4 shows the function vˆ, the concave closure,
and the optimal information disclosure when ρµR ≤ 1µO . In the figures, µ denotes
the probability that θ = 1. vˆ is a step function: the incumbent leader’s expected
payoff is 0 whenever µ < µR, ρ whenever µR ≤ µ < µO, and 1 whenever µ ≥ µO.
As panel C in Figure B.3 shows, the signal induces two posterior values: µl = 0
and µh = µR.
Let the probability that the realized signal induces a belief of µR be α. Because
the distribution τ is Bayes plausible, we must have
(1− α)× 0+ α× µR = µ0.
This implies that α = µ
0
µR
. Hence, the optimal τ is that with probability α = µ
0
µR




is 0. Now, we compute the signal that induces the optimal τ. Denote the optimal
information disclosure with a realization space {s−, s+} by pi∗. If the realization
is s−, the ruling faction replaces the incumbent, σR = 0. If the realization is s+, the
ruling faction retains the incumbent, σR = 1, while the opposition faction replaces
the incumbent given the chance, σO = 0. Let pi+θ = Pr[s
+|θ], i.e. the probability
that the realized signal is s+given the state of the world θ and pi−θ = Pr[s
−|θ],
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if θ = 0
(B.3)
and pi−θ = 1− pi+θ .
Similarly, we could derive the optimal information disclosure in panel C Fig-
ure B.4. Notice that when ρµR =
1
µO
. L is indifferent to the following information
disclosures. The information disclosure induces posteriors which are 0, µR, and
µO. The probability combination (1− αR − αO, αR, αO) over the above posterior
combination must satisfy the following Bayesian plausible requirement
(1− αA − αO)× 0+ αR × µR + αO × µO = µ0
where αR ∈ [0, 1] and αO ∈ [0, 1]. To simplify the discussion without loss of
generality, we assume that among all the indifferent information disclosure, the
incumbent chooses the one which assign 0 probability to the posterior αO. Denote
the optimal information disclosure with a realization space {s−, s++} by pi∗∗ . If
the signal realization is s−, the ruling faction replaces the incumbent, σR = 0. If
the signal realization is s++, the ruling faction retains the incumbent, σR = 1,
and the opposition faction retains the incumbent given the chance, σO = 1. Let
pi++θ = Pr[s
++|θ] and pi−θ = Pr[s−|θ]. We have
pi++θ =
{





if θ = 0
(B.4)
and pi−θ = 1− pi++θ .
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Proofs





It is clear that µ > κ > µ.
Proof. Proposition 1 For each probabilty of pandering p, the associated equlib-







we have pi′(p; ρ) = pi(ρ+ (1− ρ)p) + (1− pi)((1− ρ) + ρp).
The incumbent chooses p∗ such that µB = κ − d.








where pi′(p∗; ρ) = pi(ρ+ (1− ρ)p∗) + (1− pi)((1− ρ) + ρp∗).
The majority group votes for the incumbent regardless of the policy observa-
tion.
Proof. Proposition 2 In incumbent chooses p∗∗such that µA = κ + d. The associ-







where pi′(p∗∗; ρ) = pi(ρ+ (1− ρ)p∗∗) + (1− pi)((1− ρ) + ρp∗∗).
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The majority group votes for the incumbent regardless of the policy observa-
tion.





It is easy to show that µ− κ < κ − µ.
Proof. Proposition 3 µA = piκpiκ+pi′(1−κ)
where pi′(p; ρ) = pi(ρ+ (1− ρ)p) + (1− pi)((1− ρ) + ρp)
µA is decreasing in p, i.e. the voter discount the fact that policy A might come




When d < µ− κ, two possible pandering strategies. First, the incumbent could
choose the likelihood of pandering ph such that µB = κ − d. Only the partisan
voter vote for the incumbent. Let ph(d; κ, ρ,pi) be the ph that solves the following
equation.
pi(ρ+ (1− ρ)ph) + (1− pi)((1− ρ) + ρph) = piκ( 1κ−d − 1)
Receiving signal b, a low type incumbent who adopts the above strategy ex-
pects to get elected with probility 12 . This is because regardless which policy
choice they observe, her partisan voter votes for her while the opponent voter
doesn’t vote for her.
Second, the incumbent could choose the likelihood of pandering pl such that
µA = κ + d. Both the opponenent and the partisan vote for the incumbent. Let
pl = pl(d; κ, ρ,pi) be the pl that solves the following equation.
pi(ρ+ (1− ρ)pl) + (1− pi)((1− ρ) + ρpl) = piκ( 1κ+d − 1).
Similar to the lemma 2, we could prove that κ − µB > µA − κ = d. The op-
ponent won’t vote for the incumbent observing an unpopular policy choice. Re-
ceiving signal b, a low type incumbent who adopts the above strategy expects to
get elected with pl. pl is the frequence of pandering to the opponent and hence
the frequency of the opponent voting for the incumbent. If the incumbent pan-
ders to the opponent, as the polarization decreases, the incumbent panders more
frequently and the probability that the opponent voter votes for her is higher.
When the incumbent receives a signal suggesting an unpopular policy, the
benefit of being elected is greater than the benefit from informative decision mak-
ing. So the incumbent chooses the pandering strategy that maximizes her elec-
toral probability. if the incumbent The incumbent hence chooses to pander to the
opponent if pl ≥ 1/2.
This condition satifies when
d ≤ dˆ(pi, κ, ρ)
where dˆ(pi, κ, ρ) = ( pi1
2 (pi(1−ρ)+(1−pi)ρ)+piρ+(1−pi)(1−ρ)+piκ
− 1)κ.
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At the threshold dˆ, if the incumbent panders to the partisan voter, µpA − κ <
κ − µpB = d. If she panders to the opponent, d = µoA − κ < κ − µoB. Thus we
have µpA < µ
o
A. In other words, the incumbent’s policy choice as signal for her
competence is less informative when the incumbent panders to the partisan voter
than to the opponent. As a result, at the threshold, the incumbent is more likely
to pander if she targets the partisan than she targets the opponent.
We could also show that ph(dˆ; κ, ρ,pi) > pl(dˆ; κ, ρ,pi). The value ph(dˆ; κ, ρ,pi)
and pl(dˆ; κ, ρ,pi) are pinned down by the following equations.
pi(ρ+ (1− ρ)ph) + (1− pi)((1− ρ) + ρph) = piκ( 1κ−dˆ − 1)
pi(ρ+ (1− ρ)pl) + (1− pi)((1− ρ) + ρpl) = piκ( 1κ+dˆ − 1).
Based on the fact that pi(ρ+ (1− ρ)p) + (1− pi)((1− ρ) + ρp) is increasing in
p and that piκ( 1
κ−dˆ − 1) > piκ( 1κ+dˆ − 1), we have ph(dˆ; κ, ρ,pi) > pl(dˆ; κ, ρ,pi).
